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Abstract
ACCOMMODATING EXISTING
SETTLEMENTS IN LARGE
SCALE DEVELOPMENT:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SHA TIN NEW TOWN
HONG KONG
by James R. Richardson
This thesis examines several problems associated with
large-scale construction projects proposed for areas with
existing settlements. It focuses on how local people
affect and are affected by government policies and the
resulting project development.
The purpose is to suggest how the development office in
Sha Tin New Town ought to design its policies for existing
villages. Two additional international new town projects
are reviewed as examples of problems that governments
encounter. The two other projects also provide examples of
policies that the governments have instituted.
Historically, many large-scale development projects
have encountered resistance from local settlers. Conflicts
between indigenous settlers at the project site and
governments that are creating new environments occur
because of rarcid environmental changes and uncertainty
surrounding the local settlement's future. Many of the
immigrants arriving in the early stages of development also
experience uncertainty and perceive the same rapid changes.
The thesis makes recommendations for three villages
located in Sha Tin. The villages were chosen to illuminate
issues and problems with relocating a village in one case
and preserving a village in another. The final case
addresses redeveloping a village with the villagers
retaining development rights. Recommendations will be made
for each of the villages around:
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Department of Urban
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--structuring
development
villagers.
positive
office
interactions between the
professionals and the local
--resolving problems with land occupancy, both by the
villagers and by nearby squatters.
--organizing the appropriate processes and institutions
at the village level to ease each village's
transition in the new town development.
The thesis concludes with recommendations for the
development of Sha Tin New Town in Hong Kong. The
recommendations suggest how the development office can
structure a participatory process for villages and
residents in the new town.
It is hoped that the findings of this thesis may be
useful for the Sha Tin New Town Development Office and for
practitioners seeking to improve means of working with
indigenous populations and settlements in large scale
development.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
BACKGROUND
City Scene
In the spring of 1976 I received a fellowship from
the Henry Luce Foundation to work and travel in Southeast
Asia. My professional work assignment as a Luce scholar
was with the Hong Kong government in the Sha Tin New Town
Development Office. The assignment began in the fall of
the same year when I arrived in Hong Kong; it concluded
late in the summer of 1977. My responsibilities ranged
from administrative duties and contract supervision to
design review, site planning and large scale design.
When I arrived, the Sha Tin professional staff in-
cluded three engineers, two planners, an architect and a
project manager. My official position was senior ar-
chitect/planner; working in this role allowed me the
freedom to observe and research several issues related to
the Sha Tin development process. In 1976 the project was
three years into a ten year time horizon and in. all
phases of development: long range planning, detailed
design and construction.
Traditional Villages
Hong Kong Land Tenure
I became interested in the future of several Chinese
villages located in the Sha Tin Valley as a result of
coordinating the Sha Tin landscape master plan consulting
contract. Interactions with professionals from the
landscape firm and frequent observations in the field
revealed several conflicts between the goals of the
development office and local villages. These problems,
including land rights, village relocation and the socio-
economic future of the villagers, seemed analogous to
situations in America with which I was familiar.
Although Hong Kong is a British colony in which most
land belongs to Britain, the land tenure system for the
New Territories of Hong Kong is similar in many respects
to the land tenure system structured for Indian reserva-
tions in the United States. Just as traditional Chinese
villagers in Hong Kong have legal rights to their land
dating back to the 1898 Treaty of Nanking between China
and Britain, American Indians also have treaty rights to
their reservation lands. In both cases the government
Village Photo
has instituted an administrative system to protect and
coordinate the lands held by the indigenous population.
In Hong Kong the New Territories Administration coor-
dinates Chinese land ownership for the traditional vil-
lages; in America, the Bureau of Indian Affairs administ-
ers land owned by Indian tribes. Further, the Hong Kong
government has limited legal jurisdiction over tradition-
al village areas -- state governments in America also
have severely limited jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tions located within state boundaries.
These similarities were particularly meaningful to me
because I had worked as an architect for the Rosebud
Sioux Indian tribe and had lived on the Rosebud
Reservation in South Dakota for three years prior to
returning to graduate school at MIT. Thus there were
several analogies to spark and guide my curiosity as I
worked for the Hong Kong government in Sha Tin.
Given my past experiences with American Indians and
an interest in land tenure systems, I became fascinated
with examining the relationship between the Hong Kong
government and the traditional villagers in the New
Territories of Hong Kong. This experience led to an in-
vestigation of how the Sha Tin development office ap-
proached problems with the existing villages on the new
town site and how the local villagers were responding to
the government's policies.
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Chapter 2:
Framework For Analysis
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THE CASE STUDIES In order to look at Sha Tin New Town in a broader
context, I selected two additional new town projects to
illuminate several key issues. My choice was motivated
by a desire to select two other projects having compar-
able tension between the government's development goals
and the resulting development pattern. The projects also
should have several similar dimensions including urban
scale, population goals, existing village settlements,
distinct government policies and local land rights.
I therefore chose to examine the new towns of Ciudad
Guayana in Venezuela and Milton Keynes in England -- both
confronted with indigenous populations to accommodate and
existing settlements to incorporate in the development.
In each project the indigenous settlers had legal rights
to their land, and in each development the respective
government formulated policies that were directed at
these settlers.
Ciudad Guayana is a new town project undertaken in
the mid-1960's by the Venezuelan government in an
ambitious effort to develop remote natural resources. In
addition to the problems encountered by any development
in a remote area, the Venezuelan government had to cope
with indigenous settlements and a flood of squatters
since the project's inception.
Milton Keynes, a new town under construction north of
London, is scheduled to reach its target population by
the year 2000. This project, reflecting the best tradi-
tion of British town planning and design, is also govern-
ment sponsored. The land for Milton Keynes will be taken
publicly and converted from farm land to urban uses. The
development area is occupied with several small towns and
villages.
The Sha Tin design also reflects the traditional land
use pattern for many British new towns. The Hong Kong
government has had to confront problems with incorporat-
ing legally existing villages, communicating with in-
digenous settlers and accommodating squatters. Like
Ciudad Guayana and Milton Keynes, the infrastructure,
15
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
land formation and some housing in Sha Tin is to be
financed with public dollars.
The local population in each of these projects
responded to government policies directed at the settle-
ments, but the process of policy initiation and local
response has engendered differing consequences for each
development. In all three cases the response fluctuated
according to the level of sensitivity exhibited by the
government toward the settler's interests.
Government policy objectives have explicit and often
implicit implications for the residents of indigenous
settlements. In many cases settlement policies are in-
stituted because measures must be taken to compensate lo-
cal villagers for land that has been taken or to ease the
economic transition from rural to urban life. These
policies usually are derived from a range of choices
available to the government authorities.
Some of the government policies are designed to
preserve existing settlements, some to relocate
16
Relationship Between The
Professionals and the
Local People
settlements and some to integrate settlements into the
new town environment. In Milton Keynes, the policies are
designed to encourage the local population's participa-
tion in planning and development decisions. Many times
the policies may clarify the local settlement's role in
the project and accommodate local social and economic
needs. Essentially, however, all of these policies are
aimed at facilitating the development process.
An indigenous population often can influence the
government's settlement policies. Typically, this in-
fluence is exerted after construction on the project
begins and the concommitant effects on the local land
values ensue. The influence usually results in a high
degree of interaction between government and the concern-
ed local people. The following framework will be used to
clarify this interaction so that the results of the
government policies can be more clearly evaluated.
An examination of three key relationships will be
used in this thesis to assess the degree to which
Relationship Between The
Local People and the Land
indigenous settlers affect the direction of government
policy objectives. The first relationship centers on
interactions between government professionals working on
the development and the local settlers. These interac-
tions will be examined according to physical proximity
and the socio-economic relationship existing between the
professionals and the local community. Specifically,
this inquiry will ask:
--Where is the planning and development office lo-
cated relative to the project site?
--What are the class relationships between the local
inhabitants and the professionals?
--How do the planners view the local citizens?
--How does the local population view the government
project, its programs and policies?
The second dimension includes highlighting the
relationship between the local settlers and the land.
This inquiry will include looking at both historic
relationships and legal rights that the local settlers
have to the land they occupy at the project site. This
analysis asks:
Political and Institutional
Relationships
THE NEW TOWN PROJECTS
--What are the historic ties to the land?
--What are the tenure rights of the existing
settlements?
--What are the rights of squatters?
The third and final dimension of this analysis ad-
dresses political and institutional relationships includ-
ing the local settlers' support for or opposition to the
project. In addition to defining the capabilities of ex-
isting local government institutions this part of the
evaluation asks:
--To what extent do local groups exert political
pressure on the government?
--What is the government's response to local
pressure?
--How effective are the local governmental institu-
tions at the project site?
Each of the three new towns presents a unique context
for development: each project reflects its own culture,
society and political economy. Although there are
similarities, each project is guided by its particular
land tenure and legal relationships. However, early in
19
the planning stages each government development entity
made a set of choices that determined both the
government's policies and the resulting response from the
local settlers.
These choices set the pattern for the resulting
dialogue by establishing a process for molding government
policies. Initially, the governments decided whether to
produce a detailed master plan for the project or provide
a flexible structure within which the new town could in-
crementally grow. The governments chose to locate the
development authority near the project or some distance
away from the site. Professional government planners and
consultants helped decide whether to alter and redirect
established local growth patterns or whether to structure
the development so that it grows outward from existing
settlement patterns.
These early strategic decisions determined if the
government should preserve existing settlements or
relocate the settlers to another site. Relocation
Ciudad Guayana
- CLLCTO RMOUM
Ciudad Guayana - New town
plan
policies required that the governments address questions
of compensation. These questions include asking how much
compensation is fair; to whom should the compensation go;
and what form should the compensation take? Finally, the
governments decided whether to consult the local people
in making development decisions or whether to inform them
of after-the-fact decisions.
Ciudad Guayana is planned to house an estimated
400,000 people in order to develop an abundant natural
resource base. Beginning in the mid 1960's, the project
was planned for completion in 1975. Early in the plan-
ning phases the Venezuelan government imported a broad
range of professional skills and expertise from the
Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies to help
develop the new town.
In 1960 several governmental bodies that shared
responsibility for developing Ciudad Guayana were con-
solidated into the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana
(CVG). The CVG was granted broad authority to develop
and implement a coordinated new town plan. However
headquarters for the CVG was located in Caracas, some 300
miles from the new town project site. Consequently, the
professionals had little contact with the indigenous
residents of the Guayana region. The government's
development strategy called for relocating large segments
of the existing population and reorienting the flow of
immigrants to fit a pre-established physical master plan.
Although the squatters and villagers were compensated
for relocation costs, the planners and citizens alike had
many misconceptions about development of Ciucad Guayana.
The government found immigration flows to be difficult to
control, and the rudimentary local government and vil-
lagers perceived Caracas based directives to be confus-
ing. Finally, the local people mounted several protests,
and in 1974 the CVG opened an on-site development office.
The local development office provided the residents with
an avenue for essential information and allowed the
professionals to respond more rapidly to on-site
problems. The project is still under construction today.
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Milton Keynes
Milton Keynes - New town
plan
In Milton Keynes, England, 21,900 acres of farmland
is being developed to accommodate a new town for 400,000
people by the year 2000. The project is planned accord-
ing to a flexible set of physical and program guidelines
proposed by the consulting firm of Llewelyn-Davies,
Weeks, Forestier-Walker and Bor. The authority to
develop Milton Keynes is derived from the British New
Towns Act of 1946 and is delegated to the Milton Keynes
Development Corporation. Planning work on the new town
began in the mid-1960's, while the consultant's report
was issued in 1967. There is an on-site office for the
development corporation, the chief agency in the new town
with responsibility for coordinating the appropriate
governmental authorities affecting the development.
However, the corporation does not replace the normal
functions of the existing local governments.
In Milton Keynes the professional staff consults with
residents of villages located within the development
boundaries through surveys and open public meetings. The
-u~sO CWmm A
Sha Tin New Town
corporation and consultants made an early decision that
existing villages in the area would be incorporated into
Milton Keynes through an incremental process of renovat-
ing, upgrading and preserving selected structures. The
government hopes that these actions will enhance the
economic life of the villages and contribute to social
diversity in Milton Keynes. The project is still under
construction.
British law requires that the new town plan is
reviewed by the affected local governments at each stage
of development. Local government in England is well or-
ganized, mature, and politically integrated into the
fabric of public decision making. In Milton Keynes the
arriving immigrants were, for the most part, well edu-
cated and there were no problems with squatters.
Sha Tin New Town, located in the New Territories of
Hong Kong, is being developed to ease severely crowded
living conditions. A detailed master plan for Sha Tin
was first issued in 1960 and later revised when
Sha Tin - New town plan
construction began in 1975. The new town will be con-
structed over a ten year time horizon, will provide
housing for approximately 500,000 people, and will cover
some 4,500 acres.
The Hong Kong government decided the new town
projects should have an on-site development office.
However, because the staff is dominated by western
professionals, there is limited direct communication be-
tween the Chinese settlers and the government planners.
There are more than thirty-five traditional Chinese vil-
lages in the Sha Tin valley and approximately 20,000 im-
migrants are living in new housing estates constructed
since 1975.
Since the project began, the residents have had one
official opportunity to comment on the new town master
plan, but local villagers have protested on several occa-
sions. According to the Sha Tin master plan, some of the
villages will be relocated, but most will be preserved
within the new town structure. The development office
RECOMMENDATIONS
has not articulated an overall strategy to guide these
villages through economic and physical transition from
the existing rural setting to urban life.
Today, squatters occupy available land near the ex-
isting villages, while light industrial and manufacturing
enterprises abound in response to the first phases of
construction on Sha Tin and the increasing land values.
So far, the master plan does not allow for village level
incremental redevelopment in the development process.
Each development zone is phased on a pre-set time line,
and the government moves the illegal squatters and en-
terprises so that Sha Tin can proceed on schedule.
Working and living in Hong Kong keyed in my interest
to explore what actions can aid the Sha Tin New Town
development process. The analysis of Ciudad Guayana and
Milton Keynes new towns provide direction for resolving
conflicts between the traditional villagers and the Sha
Tin development office. This research shows that in-
digenous populations can be accommodated and government
professionals can provide residents with an avenue to
receive and give information about the development
process.
The thesis makes specific recommendations for each of
three villages located in the Sha Tin Valley. The vil-
lages were chosen to illuminate issues and problems with
relocating a village in one case and preserving a village
in another. The final case will address redeveloping a
village with the villagers retaining development rights.
Recommendations will be made for each of the villages
around:
--structuring positive interactions between the develop-
ment office professionals and the local villagers.
--resolving problems with land occupancy, both by the
villagers and by nearby squatters.
--organizing the appropriate processes and institutions
at the village level to ease each village's transition
in the new town development.
Chapter 3:
Ciudad Guayana -Venezuela
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INTRODUCTION The planning and development of Ciudad Guayana
presents a clear case of rapid population growth and
technolcgical progress in a short time. The new town,
located in southeastern Venezuela, was planned to accom-
modate 400,000 people by the late 1970's. The develop-
ment resulted from a national planning effort aimed at
the region's abundant natural resources. The Venezuelan
government intended to develop hydroelectric power and
primary industries by attracting a skilled labor force
and private investment sufficient to create a major new
regional economic center.
The first ten years of formal planning for Ciudad
Guayana reveal contradictions between the government
goals for the city and the immediate needs of the local
residents. The government professionals viewed Ciudad
Guayana as an ideal arena in which to implement a complex
development program, and the local population viewed the
economic activity as beneficial but experienced problems
with the distribution of utilities, housing, jobs and
community services.
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The Setting
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Regional location - Ciudad
Guayana
The project was remote and local expertise scarce.
There was no major, tradition-bound population living in
Guayana, transportation networks were simple and rudimen-
tary, and the national government could control the ex-
isting land ownership patterns.
The lower Orinoco Valley, located some 300 miles from
Venezuela's capital city, Caracas, is a region teeming
with natural resources. After early development by two
U.S. owned steel companies, the Venezuelan government
began constructing the Macauga hydroelectric station on
the Caroni River in the early 1950's and initiated
development of a steel plant on the Orinoco River boost-
ing the population to 45,000 people over the following
ten years.
In 1960 the president of Venezuela established the
Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), an autonomous
public corporation, and charged it with the respon-
sibility to devise an overall strategy for developing the
region. The CVG decided to augment its limited staff
--- MAOR ARTERDERS
-- COLLECTOR ROUTES
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Cuidad Guayana -New Town
ilL
Plan
with foreign expertise by contracting with the
Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center for Urban Studies in 1961.
The Joint Center team came to Guayana with a broad range
of skills including architecture, anthropology, agricul-
ture, economics, education, engineering, housing, law,
real estate, political science, sociology and transporta-
tion planning.2
The boundaries for the new town included the existing
mining settlements, the steel mill, and the hydro-
electric project. The most important traditional settle-
ment, San Felix, contained concentrated housing and an
active commercial base. By 1960 the population of San
Felix was 13,000 with 8,000 persons living to the south
and west in two communities called El Roble and Dalla
Costa. There were few paved roads, no water lines and
underdeveloped utility systems; expansion was haphazard.3
The CVG planners decided to ignore this existing
development pattern when they designed the masterplan for
the new city. The CVG wanted to create a new commercial
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PROFESSIONALS AND THE
LOCAL PEOPLE
center for Ciudad Guayana on the west bank of the Caroni
River. This new center, Alta Vista, was to be created by
providing space for immigrants in planned sub-divisions
on the west side of the river. The planners hoped that
these new residential settlements and commercial
amenities would attract skilled labor and the management
personnel essential to the future economic viability of
Ciudad Guayana.
The government decided to locate the CVG headquarters
in Caracas, nearly 300 miles from the project site, be-
cause it was the national focus of political power. In
addition the available professional expertise was located
there, and Caracas was a major social and cultural
center.
The administrative personnel responsible for city
planning were committed to civil service, but neither
their work nor the centers of power and advancement
necessitated their living near Ciudad Guayana. The Joint
Center professionals were oriented toward developing
Attitudes of the
Professionals
international careers. They tended to prefer Caracas as
a place to live and had an acute sense of their
dependence on official approval from the CVG
headquarters.4 At that time there were no telephone con-
nections, the mail system was inefficient, and bus
transport took 14 hours.5 Because the professionals were
based in Caracas, they could not benefit from first hand
knowledge about the effects of their planning decisions.
In addition to communication problems, many of the
planners had a paternalistic attitude toward the local
population. One MIT researcher, Lisa Peattie, observed
that the planners viewed themselves as the motivating
force behind the project and viewed the city as something
they were planning and developing for the good of
Venezuela. This attitude complemented a feeling by some
of the professionals that the local population was too
unfamiliar with the project and too uneducated to take
part in the planning process. Most of the 45,000 local
people were lower class and were so viewed by the plan-
ners in Caracas.6
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
LOCAL PEOPLE AND THE LAND
At its inception the CVG was granted broad power to
acquire and dispose of public and private lands. Control
over public land was transferred from the government land
agency to the CVG corporation, and private land was pur-
chased by negotiating with the respective owners.
Through this process most of the land within the city's
boundaries came under CVG control.
Although the government's policy objectives for
Ciudad Guayana had important implications for the local
population, there was no effort to consult with the
people. The objectives of the growth management policies
included:
(1) Expanding the population with economic growth;
(2) Attracting people with industrial skills to staff
Ciudad Guayana's economy;
(3) Postponing the build-up of a population of un-
skilled migrants not essential to industrial
development;
35
Housing Choices
(4) Importing technical support staff on a temporary
basis; and
(5) Expanding the more desirable parts of the city
faster than the squatter settlements and locating
most new growth near Puerto Ordaz.7
The local settlers affected these government policies
by choosing to live in the traditional centers and
through their own efforts, to improve these areas which
resulted in complications for the project. Initially the
choices new immigrants made about where to live influen-
ced the development of Ciudad Guayana. In 1962, three
quarters of the 50,000 people living in the city chose to
live near San Felix, because it was the traditional cen-
ter of commercial activity and community life. It served
as the political center for the local government when the
offices of the district council were located there.
The planners selected a site for the new city center
removed from the traditional centers near San Felix. The
planners hoped that the creation of the Alta Vista center
36
Squatter's Rights
would stimulate high quality commercial development.
However, most immigration occurred around the traditional
centers near San Felix, and the city's development was
not balanced as planned.8
Alta Vista was vacant as late as 1964, because most
immigrants were lower class and had insufficient income
levels to support a major commercial center some distance
from their homes. Additionally, squatters arrived faster
than the planners could accommodate them. Many of the
new arrivals simply squatted on the edge of the existing
centers creating "unplanned" development.
Squatter's legal rights are protected by the
Venezuelan civil code stipulating that any person improv-
ing the land of another in good faith is entitled to com-
pensation if removed from the land. The CVG officials
quickly discovered that once the land was cleared it had
to be developed immediately or another group of squatters
would move in, and compensation would have to be paid a
second time in order to clear the land. 9
PATTERNS OF LOCAL INFLUENCE
In 1965 the CVG established a local entity to deal
with low income community development in response to
squatter immigration. The Fundacion de la Vivenda del
Caroni (FUNVICA) was created to give the local people
limited authority and to implement several experimental
self-help housing projects.
The creation of FUNVICA represented the first step
toward aligning government planning more closely with the
local governments. Addressing the needs and expectations
of the local population represented a major shift in the
government's mainline planning strategy.
Local influence in Ciudad Guayana can be divided
roughly into two time periods: from the formation of the
CVG in 1960 to the mid-1960's; and from 1966 to 1970.
The earlier period was dominated by a lack of community
structure sufficient to represent broad interests, while
the later period represented more organized resistance
and coordinated response.
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Local Politicians
In most instances the municipal government competed
for jurisdiction with the local school system, the
FUNVICA, and the CVG.10 On the local level a district
council handled complaints by neighborhood residents
against the controlling powers; however, the local people
did not believe the council offered a viable avenue for
influence, because it had not developed an ability to un-
derstand the operating style of the CVG.11
A survey taken in 1964 revealed that half of the lo-
cal people contacted had not even heard of the CVG or
were misinformed about its role in development of the
city. Lisa Peattie pointed out in her book, View from
the Barrio, that "The local politicians are very, very
local indeed; their access to the party structure at the
top, even within their own party, is hardly greater than
that of the average local resident, ... the members of
the San Felix municipal council know nothing about the
sewer systems and very little about the structure of the
development agency, they too felt powerless with
reference to the CVG."12
Revising the Strategy
An analysis of population projections showed that to
attain the CVG's balanced growth goal, 99% of all growth
(for six years) after 1962 would have to occur on the
western side of the Orinoco River.13 The planners decided
that the only way to begin controlling the flow of squat-
ters was to provide planned settlements or "reception
areas" for the arriving immigrants. Unfortunately, plan-
ners were unable to provide housing sites fast enough for
the incoming population.
In 1966 the CVG revised its implementation strategy
in an effort to mitigate local problems at the site. The
result was a change in the style of interaction with the
local settlers and arriving squatters. The Municipal
Council's representative on the FUNVICA board was given
equal voting weight with the CVG representative. A local
office of the CVG was established to coordinate planning
decisions with the Municipal Council, various utility in-
terests, and community service organizations.14
Because the planners underestimated the influx of low
income settlers, the government altered its goal of at-
tracting people with industrial experience and skills to
staff Ciudad Guayana's economy. By the mid 1970's the
CVG had yet to reduce substantially the level of imported
foreign expertise to provide assistance to industrial
operations. This situation is slowly changing as local
government solves problems, the quality of housing im-
proves, and commercial activity emerges in the town
center.
The relationship of the professionals to the local
people, the relationship of the local people to the land;
and the patterns of local influence in Ciudad Guayana all
affected the government's original set of objectives.
The initial decision to locate the headquarters of
the CVG 300 miles from the project prevented adequate
communication between the local settlers and the profes-
sionals. The planners were unable to respond to
day-to-day problems at the site, and the locals could not
CONCLUSION
understand the planners' goals. Ultimately, the
government learned that it was necessary to staff an
on-site office of the CVG.
Class distinctions between the planners and the local
people led to delays in dealing with the massive influx
of immigrants. In time the professionals realized that
it would only be possible to build the city as envisioned
by accommodating the needs of the overwhelmingly low in-
come populous. The strategy of neglecting squatter set-
tlements in order to construct a new town center to at-
tract skilled, higher income workers simply did not work;
it had to be adjusted and a balanced approach pursued.
In Ciudad Guayana the existing villagers have strong
historic ties to the land and there are legal rights as-
sumed by arriving squatters. By failing to recognize the
importance of these ties the planners assumed that growth
could be directed away from San Felix and reoriented near
Puerto Ordaz. The objective could not be realized. The
traditional settlements had a vitality and economic life
matching the expectations and needs of the existing
population and most new immigrants. The planners learned
that they must provide housing sites and services to ac-
commodate these immigration streams in order to avoid
paying unnecessary dual compensation for the squatters'
land rights.
The new city center was not constructed within the
intended time frame, because the CVG was unsuccessful in
attracting the necessary private commercial business ven-
tures. The economic status of the immigrants could not
support high quality commercial activity, and the depart-
ment stores were reluctant to locate in Ciudad Guayana
because of these market conditions. The government
learned to institute programs aimed at upgrading the
education and skills of the local population as well as
to import Venezuelan professionals to work in the Guayana
industries.
The patterns of local influence demonstrated that
detailed master planning alone does not guarantee
success. The longer the planners remained in their world
of plans and papers, the more the local settlers resisted
the efforts of the Caracas based directives. It was only
after the local political infrastructure organized and
after the CVG established formal avenues for communica-
tion that the local people began to understand the nature
of the project. The FUNVICA organization resulted in a
more coordinated effort to solve low income housing
problems. Compared to the early planning years, Ciudad
Guayana is now moving toward a partnership between the
local residents and government planners.
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Chapter 4:
Milton Keynes New Town-
England
INTRODUCTION
- -- Proposed Stratqgc Routes
-Propoed Now and Improved Roads
-Proposed Atom Roads in Milton Kogmee
Regional location - Milton
Keynes
The Setting
When complete Milton Keynes will provide homes for
four hundred thousand people by the early 1990's and ac-
commodate population overspill from the urban areas of
London and Birmingham. With legal authority derived from
England's New Towns Act of 1946 Milton Keynes is being
constructed on 21,900 acres of farmland.1
The government established a development corporation
located at the project site to provide a central
authority for all aspects of the development. When the
development corporation began to assemble land for the
development in 1967, the population of Milton Keynes was
approximately 40,000 people who were living in existing
towns and villages; construction began in 1970 and by
1975 the population had grown to 70,000 people in accord-
ance with the predetermined strategy.
Milton Keynes lies in one of the most important
transportation corridors in Britain: the Ml highway con-
nects London with the industrial midlands. The project
site is midway between London and Birmingham with two
railways and the Grand Union Canal crossing the site.
The consultants believed the project's proximity to the
Technological Institute at Cranfield and to Cambridge and
Oxford Universities made it an exceptionally attractive
center for the development of new science-based
industries 2
When Milton Keynes was designed, the bulk of the ex-
isting population lived in one of four towns: Bletchley,
Stony Stratford, Wolverton or New Bradwell.
Additionally, there were eight smaller villages in the
designated area with the balance of the population spread
across 17,000 acres of countryside.3
Although the location of existing communities define
its basic physical form, the design for Milton Keynes was
based on a transportation grid.4 Additionally, within
these communities the planners had to accommodate a num-
ber of buildings having historic or achitectural sig-
nificance. The development area contained sites of
archaeological interest, including the main corridor from
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Suggested Conservation Areas
Archeological Sites
Milton Keynes - New Town Plan
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London to the northwest originally built and used by the
Romans.5
The planners' strategy called for providing medium-
sized neighborhoods with local schools, shops and com-
munity facilities. The plan also detailed a new city
center containing a regional shopping mall that would of-
fer entertainment, offices, shops and recreational
facilities.
Milton Keynes has overspill agreements with London
and Birmingham to provide jobs and relieve congestion in
residential areas. Citizens willing to move to the new
city are put on waiting lists by the older community, and
when job vacancies open in Milton Keynes they are
notified and given priority status over applicants from
other areas. Citizens become eligible for housing when
their new employer nominates them. In addition to ensur-
ing that the new city takes most of its population from
London and Birmingham, the overspill agreements control
development timing and location of immigrants by
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LOCAL PEOPLE
Farmers' Concerns
coordinating the arriving settlers with available housing
and jobs. 6
The Milton Keynes Development Corporation hired a
consultant who showed special sensitivity to local con-
trol and social development. In their response to the
request for proposal the consultants said, "The general
conclusion was that Milton Keynes must be planned to give
people what they want and no committee of experts should
try to dictate the future patterns of life in the city.
This is not a new idea, but it is new to take it
seriously..."7
Seventy-three percent of the land designated for
development in Milton Keynes is currently agricultural
land supporting a total of 225 farmers and farm workers.
Farmers are concerned that they may live in an "agricul-
tural slum" during the transitional period, although
plans for the new city are phased so that farm land can
be used as long as possible before actual construction
begins. Additionally, farmers losing income will be
fully compensated for their land and livelihood.
Consultations Shortly after a local office of the development cor-
poration opened at the Milton Keynes site, the consul-
tants held several open meetings on the master plan and
administered a door to door survey. Concerns included
the link road alignment, provision of public transporta-
tion, effect on existing settlements, preservation of
village areas, the city's cost, and adequate public ser-
vices. The corporation responded to questions and con-
cerns of the citizens, and several aspects of the master
plan were refined to reflect these local concerns.8
Indeed, the ongoing communication between the plan-
ners and the residents increased local understanding of
the project, allaying many of the fears of the farmers,
and was instrumental in pinpointing development problems.
Throughout the development process the people have had
ample opportunity to review and comment on the plan.
The government has responded by amending the new town
structure to meet local needs. Although a number of
problems remain to be resolved, such as the lack of mass
transit to
corporation
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access shopping in
continues to address
Outside the villages
family farmers have worked
costs that the agricultur
the new town development.
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government's policy is to
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clude moving to another
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al community bears because of
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Development Phasing
employed. The second is the loss of one's traditional
work place and historic method of making a living, an im-
portant although unquantifiable cost. 9
Many of the residents were concerned with the phasing
and timing of Milton Keynes because they had historic
ties with their homes and forms of livelihood. The con-
sultants planned to provide an economic role for the
older communities as regional shopping centers, and with
Stony Stratford
PATTERNS OF LOCAL
INFLUENCE AND
INSTITUTIONS
incentives provided by the government some of the exist-
ing commercial areas have thrived providing newcomers
with adequate shopping services before constructing the
new shopping districts. This phasing will help the older
commercial centers remain viable after Milton Keynes is
complete.
Stony Stratford, for instance, is similar in charac-
ter to a traditional English market town. When the
project began, Stony Stratford had several empty shops
and houses; property values decreased and traffic conges-
tion worsened. The corporation was able to attract new
commercial prospects to the community by working with the
citizens to upgrade the declining buildings and by con-
structing a new by-pass road to route heavy traffic
around the district. It was important to the citizens of
the community that the character of the town be preser-
ved, and so far it has been.1 0
Farmers have influenced the form and phasing of
Milton Keynes by collaborating with researchers at the
Review Process
Agricultural Department of the University of Reading.
However, local influence was greatest in the older
commercial areas, because the business people and resi-
dents were concerned about the impact of the new town
development on their economic activity. As a result of
this concern the development corporation has worked to
ensure that their position as neighborhood commercial
centers is preserved and enhanced.
Local village inhabitants and early arriving im-
migrants have influenced the development of Milton Keynes
through public meetings and surveys. The government has
used their responses from these sources of information to
refine the master plan before it was published and to
open better lines of communication between the residents
and the planners. One result of the survey was improved
government coordination of social services delivered to
existing residents and immigrants.11
The process for designing and constructing new towns
in England ensures that local authorities review and
approve proposals at various stages of the project
development. The first step is to designate a site. To
accomplish this the Minister of Housing and Local
Government consults with local authorities and allows for
public inquiry. The second step is to create a develop-
ment corporation, and the third step is to prepare and
submit a master plan for review by national agencies, lo-
cal government and concerned citizens. Finally, detailed
design plans are prepared by the corporation.1 2 The con-
sultants went beyond these legal requirements and direct-
ly consulted the local residents.
Because of historic weakness in new town social plan-
ning, the consultants not only requested special surveys
of the existing communities and new residents but also
considered a social development plan as a necessary com-
ponent of the physical development plan for the new city.
To this end they addressed institutional roles and
responsibilities for health care delivery, educational
systems, public relations, local government, churches,
housing management and public participation.13
Community Councils In addition the government supported the formation of
local community councils. These councils supplied the
institutional framework to deliver social services in
Milton Keynes, addressing such diverse activities as
grass-mowing, managing schools, delivering meals on
wheels to elderly residents, and providing basic health
care. 14
Economic conditions of the mid 1970's presented the
greatest influence on Milton Keynes development. The
world wide economic downturn caused the planners to reas-
sess several major assumptions and revise the transporta-
tion system. In spite of severe criticism, the govern-
ment was able to redirect the interim development and
proved that the plan could adapt to new conditions.
CONCLUSION In developing Milton Keynes, the government addressed
issues resulting from the relationship of the profes-
sionals to the local people, the relationship of the lo-
cal people to the land, and the patterns of local
influence and institutions.
In the early days of the development the farmers and
local people were concerned about construction phasing,
relocation and the impact of the development on existing
towns and villages. The decision to locate the develop-
ment corporation at the project site enhanced the ability
of the government to communicate directly with the
citizens. Working within a legal framework that fosters
consultation in new town development with the proper lo-
cal authorities, the consultants went beyond requirements
of the law to encourage participation in many forms:
surveys, open meetings and formal design reviews. The
result was a better understanding of the project at the
local level; a more predictable future for the farmers
whose land would be condemned; and an ability on the part
of the designers to fine tune the physical and social
development strategy.
Historically the existing communities (Bletchley,
Stony Stratford, Wolverton and New Bradwell) played key
roles in regional development north of London and the
residents felt historic ties to their communities. Many
buildings were on the historic register and several sites
of archaeological significance dotted the Milton Keynes
development area; the planners therefore designed
programs to renovate and rehabilitate these older
communities.
In addition to providing an economic role for these
communities as regional shopping centers, the development
corporation also framed much of the overall design plan
around these older communities and their existing
transportation networks. The strategy for Milton Keynes
reflected the planners' desire to expand on existing
growth patterns and provide a flexible framework to ac-
commodate future change.
The local population influenced the form and timing
of Milton Keynes' development through public meetings,
door to door surveys and complaints about the lack of
adequate public transportation. Existing institutional
support from local government in the region reinforced
these patterns of influence.
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The formal overspill agreements with London and
Birmingham assured that the development would have a pre-
dictable stream of immigrants. But, more importantly,
the policy of not providing housing for the immigrants
before they secured employment allowed the planners to
coordinate housing supply with the incoming population.
Poor economic conditions were the most pronounced in-
fluence on Milton Keynes' physical form and development
timing. The world wide recession slowed economic growth,
tilting the ratio of private investment in housing and
industry and assuring that the already small transporta-
tion system would be inadequate. Fewer people moved to
Milton Keynes and those that arrived did not own auto-
mobiles. This situation tested the major goal of the
plan: flexibility.
After a thorough review and analysis the planners
discovered that the plan could be altered to meet this
changing situation and rising local expectations.
Adjusting density and changing land uses within the
overall framework allowed the professionals to iron out
these difficulties in preparation for future development.
Chapter 5:
Sha Tin New Town-
Hong Kong
INTRODUCTION
Public housing in Kowloon
Hong Kong street
scene
When construction is complete Sha Tin New Town will
provide housing and employment for one-half million
people by 1985. The majority of the residents will come
from congested areas of Hong Kong and Kowloon. According
to a recent government publication on Sha Tin, "The en-
vironment is planned to be convenient, attractive, and
self-contained, providing new opportunities and freedom
of choice in a socially-balanced community."1
The project is being developed in the New Territories
of Hong Kong along the Shing Mun River at the intersec-
tion of several important transportation routes connect-
ing the People's Republic of China to Hong Kong. A major
portion of Sha Tin will be constructed on land fill, and
the town center will be structured around an inter-modal
transportation complex linking the Kowloon and Canton
Railway to major highway networks. A central bus ter-
minal and regional parking complex, together with of-
fices, housing and shopping facilities, will be unified
around a central plaza. The existing Sha Tin village and
TO CANTON
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Sha Tin New Town - Regional Location
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Urban squatters
marketplace, a regional shopping place for nearby vil-
lages, will be removed to make way for the new
development.
Historically, most immigrants from China chose to lo-
cate in the urban areas of Hong Kong and Kowloon. Many
of these families constructed homes out of almost every
conceivable material wherever space was available includ-
ing the rooftops of highrise buildings or junks anchored
in typhoon shelters. Today the density of one section of
Kowloon is estimated to be 5,000 to 6,000 persons per
acre, while at the urban fringe living conditions for
squatters have never been free from disease, fire,
typhoons, and landslides.
Housing conditions in Hong Kong are complicated be-
cause steep topography and soil characteristics make 79
percent of the land virtually unbuildable -- there is
little room to grow. Soon after a devastating fire
ravaged a squatter settlement in 1960 leaving 50,000
people homeless, the government began to investigate
Squatters near Sha Tin
prospects for future urban development and expansion. -n
1972, the Governor of Hong Kong approved a major housing
program to provide housing for 1.8 million people by the
mid-1980's.
The four major objectives of the housing plan are to:
--Rehouse all of Hong Kong's remaining 250,000
squatters;
--Relieve overcrowding in the urban areas;
--Provide self-contained accommodation for all
households; and,
--Provide housing for those who must be regoused as a
consequence of other government schemes.
Three new towns, Sha Tin, Tsuen Wan and Tuen Mun,
will provide most of the housing and industrial develop-
ment over a ten year time horizon. Detailed planning and
design of the new towns is being carried out by govern-
ment professionals and engineering, transportation and
architectural consultants. The Government Town Planning
Office and the Architectural Office of the Public Works
Department (PWD) are the project's major coordinators.
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development
These offices also provide most of the site planning and
design work for public buildings.
The New Territories, leased from China in 1898, in-
clude 335 square miles of mainland as well as over 100
small islands off the Kowloon peninsula. When Britain
leased the New Territories in 1898, there was little need
for governmental administration in the scattered villages
and towns; most activity was devoted to farming rice and
vegetables, or growing commercial flowers and raising
livestock. Two District Officers (one living in the
northern territories and one living in the south near Sha
Tin) were appointed by the Hong Kong Governor to handle
administrative duties for land transactions and to serve
as magistrates for criminal and civil matters.
Hong Kong's flood of immigrants after World War II
stimulated development in the rural areas and made it
necessary for the District Officers to allocate land for
housing and industrial use, and therefore the Governor
formed five separate districts to handle the rapidly
Rural New Territories
Lantau Monestary
growing new territories. With the development of the
three new towns, two new districts were created in 1974
bringing the total to seven districts, each with a
District Officer and a staff of a hundred or more.3
The Commissioner for the rural district officers, of-
ficially known as the Secretary for the New Territories,
is generally responible to the central Hong Kong govern-
ment for New Territories affairs and the welfare of its
inhabitants. The Secretary is also the land authority
for the New Territories, and is in charge of controlling
land use including allocating, disposing and acquiring
land for development. 4
The original inhabitants of the New Territories
retained possession of their village land at the time of
the British takeover. The remaining land was deemed "un-
allocated crown land" and was leased by public auction.
However, at the time of the occupation Governor Sir Henry
Blake issued a proclamation promising "commercial and
landed interests will be safeguarded and usages and good
customs will not in any way be interfered with."5
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In keeping with this original directive, the
Secretary for the New Territories must ensure that all
government policies and programs are explained to the
villagers in a way that is understandable to them. A
network of Rural Committees structured this necessary
communication. Each village has one or more "village
representative" elected or nominated to sit on the Rural
Committee. These village representatives are organized
into 27 Rural Committee areas and stay in contact with
the government through the District Offices. In addition
to providing a liaison with the Hong Kong government, the
committees arbitrate clan and family disputes and give
advice to the people in their village.6
The chairman and vice-chairman of the Rural
Committees along with other community leaders in the New
Territories form the Heung Yee Kuk. The Kuk was es-
tablished in 1926 as an assembly of appointed elders to
advise government, but over time it matured into an
elective body making its own choices. In 1957 this
system broke down when a number of elders resigned in
order to speak authoritatively on behalf of the people.
They claimed that government had no right to interfere
with the villages in the New Territories. 7
Such an assertion was unacceptable to the colonial
government which withdrew its recognition of the Kuk,
making it an unlawful society. Then a new ordinance was
passed reconstituting the Kuk as an advisory body or-
ganized under a new structure.8 Today, this statutory
body meets with the Secretary for the New Territories on
a regular basis to discuss problems and government
policies, and senior members of the Kuk also sit in on
government sub-committees dealing with land tenure and
selected policy matters. 9
According to the ordinance, the Heung Yee Kuk was
formed to promote mutual cooperation with the central
Hong Kong government. The Kuk also advises government on
social and economic development matters and encourages
traditional customs and functions in the New Territories.
In fact, the Kuk's influence is greater than its
constitutional functions suggest. For example, in 1972
the Kuk threatened to organize a protest march to demand
changes in land policy and village building regulations;
after three weeks of negotiating the Secretary for the
New Territories announced that agreement had been reached
with representatives of the Kuk on all their demands.10
When the decision was made to build the new towns,
the government decided that the rural committees could
not deal with problems related to urbanization of the New
Territories. In 1977 the Governor announced the forma-
tion of local urban advisory councils to fill the consul-
tation gap between the government and the people.
However, officially the councils are limited to giving
advice on "the provision and use of recreational and
other public facilities."11 In contrast, the respon-
sibilities of the District Officers include: gathering
political intelligence, representing the interests of the
villagers to higher authorities, coordinating activities
THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
of local government agencies, explaining government ac-
tions at the village level, administering land
transactions, controlling squatters, encouraging local
development, arbitrating disputes, assisting in educa-
tional administration, organizing relief work in emergen-
cies, and organizing social welfare activities.12
In 1973 the Public Works Department was charged with
the responsibility to plan and develop new towns. The
PWD therefore established the New Territories Development
Department (NTDD), a new division under its structure and
purview, to implement the new towns program. During
planning and development each new town is under the
direct control of a Project Manager supported by an on-
site professional staff and several consultants. When
the projects are complete, the New Town Administration
and other government departments will be responsible for
the daily management of each new town's activities. The
Sha Tin development team is composed of senior
architects, engineers, and town planners who organize and
review the work of consulting engineers, private
architects and Public Works Department employees assigned
to the project.
In the fall of 1976 the development office consisted
of a project manager, a chief planner, one senior staff
planner, one architect, and three engineers. The project
was three years into the ten year time line and was in
several overlapping phases of development: long range
planning, detailed design, site preparation and building
construction. By the end of 1977 the staff had nearly
doubled.
Sha Tin New Town will be developed in two major
stages. Stage One will accommodate a population of ap-
proximately 240,000 people in the central area of Sha
Tin. Stage Two, which will begin while Stage One is
still under construction, will finish the remaining work
necessary to complete the project and to house a total of
500,000 people.
1000J
/0700
44
Phase I
|I Phase Ii
Rail Line
Boundary
Sha Tin New Town - Phase Map
-&*Z
As with both Milton Keynes and Ciudad Guayana, the
first priority for the Sha Tin development office was to
prepare a physical plan for the new environment. Unlike
Milton Keynes, however, the Sha Tin development team is
designing a detailed master plan for the development.
Today there is an outline master plan that details land
use by development parcel and structures the major
transportation networks. The government professionals
and private consultants are now producing site designs
for each individual land parcel. After a site design is
complete it is approved by several government agencies;
the land is then acquired and cleared of any structures
or squatters. Next, the site is prepared, roads are
built, sewers are installed and utilities are connected.
After designs for individual buildings are produced and
reviewed by the government, construction begins.
As in Milton Keynes, several types of residential
communities are planned for Sha Tin. The residential
zones will vary in style, size, location and population
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density in order to encourage maximum diversity
throughout the new town. While the density in Sha Tin
will be much greater than those in either Ciudad Guayana
or Milton Keynes, it will be considerably less than that
of Hong Kong as a whole. Just as a key function of the
physical plans in Milton Keynes and Ciudad Guayana is
balance, a great deal of effort in Sha Tin has gone into
creating an appropriate balance between various town
functions. According to the plan, housing will be balan-
ced with available jobs; schools, with numbers of
children; shopping, with residential areas; and health
and social service facilities, with service needs.1 3
To achieve a balanced living environment facilities
are planned to meet the residents' basic needs including
safety, shelter, security, health, education, employment
and recreation. A development program is updated annual-
ly to coordinate the physical development and guide the
new town's progress. The development program outlines
the population projections, highlights the progress to
Sha Tin public housing
date, details changes in the government's policies,
allocates public resources and estimates the level of
private investment in the project.
Investment for Sha Tin is balanced between public and
private interests; the government hopes to build a
partnership. Approximately sixty percent of the invest-
ment in Sha Tin will be from government sources, and for-
ty percent is anticipated to come from the private sec-
tor. However., private investment is complicated in the
New Territories because the lease is due to expire in
1997, less than twenty years from the start of the new
town construction. The government's goal is to develop
Sha Tin in time to allow a reasonable ammortization
period for investment before the lease expires.
Completing the new town by the mid-1980's leaves a ten
year period before 1997, and given the structure of Hong
Kong's dynamic mortgage market, private investors can
realize returns from Sha Tin before the lease expires.
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THE SETTING
Sha Tin Mountain
Land fill
Like Milton Keynes, the site for Sha Tin was chosen
because of its physical features, its proximity to
central urban areas, and its immediate access to major
transportation networks. The New Town will be built on a
flood plain around a wide, shallow cove on the southern
end of Tolo Harbor. Surrounding this cove are foothills
leading to steep, high mountains that frame the valley's
environment. Since most of the city will be constructed
on land created from fill in the shallow cove, massive
reclamation works will be required before actual develop-
ment can take place. To date about three-fourths of the
required relclamation is complete and construction on two
residential areas, the town center, and several private
developments is underway.
Except for fill areas, land not under construction in
Sha Tin Valley has been leased back to the local vil-
lagers mostly for agricultural purposes. Of the eventual
500,000 people who will reside in the new town,
approximately 45,000 currently live in the valley. About
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Tourist Attractions
half of this population lives in two public housing
projects built since 1973, and the remaining people live
in villages scattered across the valley floor and nestled
in the foothills. There are approximately 35 villages
located within the boundaries of Sha Tin New Town and, as
stipulated in the New Territories lease agreement with
China, villagers have rights to their land. The remaind-
er of the land in Sha Tin Valley is crown land and
belongs to the British government.
Most people living in the new housing estates travel
to Kowloon to work, while most villagers living in the
low-lying areas grow vegetables and commercial flowers to
sell in Sha Tin and Kowloon. Tourism also provides a
major source of income for the local people, since a num-
ber of Hong Kong's major tourist attractions lie in the
Sha Tin Valley. The development office plans to incor-
porate many of these attractions into the new town in-
cluding the historic walled village of Tsang Tai Uk, the
Sha Tin Floating Restaurant, the Temple of Ten Thousand
Buddhas, and the To Fung Shan Mission.
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There are already some officially sanctioned light
manufacturing operations in the valley offering local
employment, including a cotton yarn factory and textile
dye works. As in Ciudad Guayana, there are also numerous
small scale manufacturing enterprises scattered
throughout the valley that have been established primari-
ly by squatters. However, with the exception of some
short term leases, the government considers the latter
operations illegal.
Government planners in the development office have
decided which villages are most compatible with the new
development and which villages must be relocated.
Several villages have already been programmed for
redevelopment or relocation, but the cost of relocating
villagers is expensive, time consuming and sometimes
violent confrontations between villagers and the district
police. The villagers find it difficult to leave their
ancestor's land to find new employment, as did the
farmers in Milton Keynes. Land in transition is not
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easily controlled, as the Ciudad Guayana planners learn-
ed. Unguided squatting in these areas has led to confu-
sion, conflict and unintended land uses.
Planning and design of Sha Tin New Town reveal wes-
tern methods. The planners and engineers in charge of
the development are European, and many of the Asian
professionals on the design team have educations from
western institutions. Consequently, the Sha Tin mas-
terplan reflects the spatial organization and land use
arrangements of other British new towns.
Like the Milton Keynes planning office, the Sha Tin
New Town Development Office is located on the project
site near the new town center in a building immediately
above the regional District Office. The interdiscipli-
nary team of architects, engineers and planners are work-
ing within planning and design standards that are more
liberal than those constraining previous Hong Kong
projects. To address environmental issues a consulting
firm completed a landscape masterplan for the project in
Attitudes of the
Professionals
April, 1977. In addition to delineating the landscape
and urban design features of the city, the master plan
provides a wealth of data on natural systems in the Sha
Tin Valley.
However, to date there has been no concurrent effort
to evaluate the human or social systems existing in the
valley. The development office has not attempted to ac-
commodate impacts of the rapid population build up on the
government's ability to coordinate necessary services.
So far the main thrust of the Development Office is to
create a physical place while the District Office coor-
dinates land transfers and relocates villagers or squat-
ters when necessary.
The professionals in the Sha Tin Development Office
tend to have a paternalistic attitude toward the local
settlers, viewing themselves as the driving force behind
the creation of the new town. Like their Venezuelan
counterparts, they feel that the local people are
insufficiently educated and too unfamiliar with the
project to benefit the development process. An interview
with a Sha Tin planning official in 1976 revealed the
prevailing attitude of the professionals toward consult-
ing with local residents.
"Participation?; Oh yes...well, it doesn't work
here. Why, the reason for participation at all
is to help inform our planning decisions.
Look, in this housing crisis we don't have time
to participate, neither do the community
people. We have looked at the problems, that
tells us what the needs are...then we set the
goals; that's planning."4
The pressures created by Hong Kong's exploding
population are compounded by severe land constraints and
fueled by the tight time horizon. In this environment
government staffing constraints and capital expenditures
have become criteria to justify urgent decisions that are
often based on insufficient information and inadequate
communication. As in Ciudad Guayana, there has been min-
imal effort to respond to village problems or to accom-
modate squatter's needs. However, unlike the Venezuelan
venture, social scientists and professionals from related
Private development design
proposal
disciplines have not been encouraged to aid the
government's planning process. Since the new town
projects began, one conference on social planning in a
new town was held at the Chinese University in 1975. In
spite of a large response from the public and university
researchers, none of the conference recommendations had
been implemented as late as 1977.
Once a public or private design plan has been submit-
ted to the Development Office, the design review is coor-
dinated among those agencies having an interest in the
development (often as many as 32 separate government
departments). Comments are synthesized, and the
developer has the opportunity to negotiate requested
changes through conferences with the project management
staff. Once approved the plan may undergo schematic
design, detailed design, working drawings or construc-
tion. At each threshold there is ample opportunity for
the government team to evaluate the proposal critically.
In spite of this thorough government review, there is
little room for local comment.
Unlike the level of local comment sought for Milton
Keynes, Sha Tin villagers and residents have had the op-
portunity to view the overall master plan once at an ex-
hibition held in the old Sha Tin town center. The
government designers displayed a land use map as well as
a model of the proposed town center. Suggestions could
be offered in a suggestion box placed near the display.
The planners were surprised that so few responses were
received in the box, although one senior planner remarked
that the villagers needed no education on how to read and
understand the land use map. The district office
received a flurry of requests for more information about
the status of villages and homes that were in clear con-
flict with proposed uses.
To accommodate the existing villages in Sha Tin the
Development Office has indicated which villages are to be
preserved, relocated, or redeveloped. The government has
no jurisdiction within village boundaries until develop-
ment rights have been acquired, but once the rights are
Economic Pressures
Illegal development
acquired redevelopment can begin. If the village is to
be preserved, a village boundary is delineated on the
master plan. In some cases the boundary abuts the vil-
lage buildings, and in some cases a small green belt sur-
rounding the village is included.
Delineating a boundary around a village does not al-
ter the pressures exerted by the surrounding development
on land values. Already villages are showing signs of
responding to the rapidly changing social and economic
forces. In addition to illegal industrial operations,
the widespread immigration of squatters into Sha Tin is a
predictable response to the growth of the new town. Like
the Ciudad Guayana experience, this rate of immigration
is increasing. So far the government has instituted a
limited program to provide squatter settlements but has
done little to guide the small scale industrial growth.
Unlike improvement schemes for the existing villages
and commercial centers in Milton Keynes, at present there
are no plans for upgrading village areas or for
Growing village
Local illegal industries
developing village extension areas. This condition is
likely to result in confusing land use, deterioration of
traditional village environments and unguided development
in the surrounding natural landscape, as it did in Ciudad
Guayana.
Village industrial and manufacturing enterprises are
likely to continue to spread as the local economy and
life styles change, but there seems to be no institution-
al or legal mechanism short of police powers to cope with
the type, style or tenure of these industries when they
appear. Because of this lack of control, many of the in-
dustries are now becoming environmental hazards.
In the fall of 1977 the development office was not
responding to these problems; the planners and designers
were busy solving Hong Kong's housing crisis. Repeated
attempts by junior Chinese planners to direct more effort
toward the villagers and squatters were not effective.
The development office, with its mandate to construct a
city in ten years, did not have enough time to
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
LOCAL PEOPLE AND THE LAND
Fung Shui and
Religious Beliefs
accommodate the increasing flow of immigrants or to guide
local "illegal" industries. In the interim the villagers
resorted to more active means to express the need to
resolve conflicts in land use, improve utility systems,
institute health care and coordinate social services.
The Sha Tin Valley, which has been farmed since the
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), has historical importance.
Flat land in the valley bottom is noted for its excellent
fertility and production of large volumes of rice.
According to local history, Sha Tin rice is of such
legendary quality that it has been served at the
Emperor's table in Peking.15 Today these agricultural
lands produce rice, vegetables and commercial flowers.
Many people in Hong Kong follow traditional religious
and mystical beliefs that blend elements of Confucianism,
Taoism, and Buddhism into a form of local religion.
Incense burning and direct communication with dieties are
integral aspects of daily life. In addition, Chinese
villagers have been using "fung shui" for thousands of
Yeun Chau Kok - Fung Shui
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years to select the best possible village sites. This
ancient practice is based on the belief that spirits
associated with water, vegetation and climatic shelter
(considered the three essential life giving elements)
will provide the residents with good fortune, successful
livelihoods and wellbeing. Faced with change in the sur-
rounding environment, villagers believe that steps must
be taken to soothe the disturbed fung shui and ancient
spirits. The appeasing process usually involves exten-
sive ceremonial rites and paying attention to the village
ancestors.
In the early stages of the development Sha Tin plan-
ners discovered they must accommodate these religious
beliefs and therefore began working with local fung shui
experts to choose relocation sites for villages and
burial grounds. Since village burial grounds are as im-
portant to the residents as the village itself, the cost-
ly, time consuming process of moving the burial grounds
has been programmed into the annual development plan for
Sha Tin.
Local Land Rights Unlike any other inhabitants of the Hong Kong and
Kowloon colonial region, the villagers have historic land
rights. The British lease for the New Territories
protects the villagers' rights to their community land
unless the rights are purchased. The lease states
that..."there will be no expropriation or expulsion of
the inhabitants of the district included within the (New
Territories) extension, and that if land is required for
public offices, fortifications, or the like official pur-
poses, it shall be bought at a fair price."l6 Further,
the treaty requires the government to provide each vil-
lage with an area for future growth. Because of the im-
portance of clan lineage to the Chinese, the treaty al-
lows the sons of village elders to have housing space in
the village area, so each village in Sha Tin must have
land adjacent to the village designated as an "expansion
area."
Currently the government compensates the village for
taking land and residential structures by granting the
LAND TRANSFER POLICIES
owner lease rights to a new lot and constructing a house.
The government provides these new houses at a rate of one
house for each 0.01 acres of land surrendered, whether or
not there is an existing structure on the lot. The
government provides compensation for use of village ex-
pansion areas by giving the owner a new lot and a
replacement structure. In practice, however, fung shui
and religious practices severely complicate the siting of
these new structures.
The methods used to compensate the local population
for adverse development impacts are similar to government
requirements in Ciudad Guayana, except that new Sha Tin
immigrants and squatters lack inherent rights to the land
and are only indirectly compensated for relocation.
While squatters sometimes receive compensation for loss
of livelihood, tenants holding short term land leases
lose their legal rights after the tenancy expires.
Given these legal, historic, and religious
complexities in the relationship between the local people
Village Relocation
and the land, the government has adopted policy
guidelines for land acquisitions in the development area.
There are six policies aimed at simplifying these complex
land transfers. The policies include:
--relocating villages to another site more compatible
with the future development;
--purchasing development rights through direct cash
compensation;
--acquiring development rights by issuing land ex-
change entitlements;
--relocating tenant farme::s to other areas of the New
Territories;
--housing squatters in public housing estates; and,
--preserving villages in their existing form and
location.
The first policy is to move the village to another
location. This option differs significantly from any of
the policy alternatives available to the governments in
Ciudad Guayana or Milton Keynes. Already because of im-
minent engineering works, some villages are being
programmed for relocation. Relocated homeowners receive
Development Rights Transfer
a new house and land at the government's exchange rate as
well as compensation for moving expenses.
The second and third policies rely on market forces
to establish appropriate levels of compensation. If a
village is to be redeveloped, the landowner may choose
between cash compensation (the second policy choice) and
a 'letter B' land exchange entitlement (the third op-
tion). The letter B entitlement gives the land owner
development rights to two-fifths of a unit of urban
building land in exchange for each unit of rural land
surrendered.
These certificates are marketable in a series, start-
ing with the oldest issue and progressing to the most
current. Each New Town development office has designated
several parcels of urban development land for redeeming
title B certificates. Developers who bid for the lease
by purchasing the required number of certificates in the
open market. The price of the certificates fluctuates
with the market value of the land to be developed.
Because the government began issuing the letter B
documents over ten years ago and has only recently begun
to redeem them, certificate holders may have to wait some
time until the entitlement enters the market. Some land-
owners are reluctant to participate in the program be-
cause the certificates are not tied to a specific piece
of land, and the local landowners in the Sha Tin Valley
have no guarantee that the certificates will be redeemed
in time to provide their needed compensation.
More importantly, the land exchange program is now
close to a point where the number of outstanding certifi-
cates will be greater than the amount of available urban
building land. However, there is still village land that
must be taken for urban development in all three new town
projects. The government may soon have to revalue the
ratio at which land is currently exchanged or offer cash
compensation only for taking land. In either case, once
the villagers sell or trade their land they typically
move into Sha Tin public housing or the Kowloon urban
area to enter the job market.
Farmers
Squatters
The government's fourth policy is directed at the
farmers and some manufacturing enterprises in the Sha Tin
Valley. In most cases the farmers and a few local in-
dustries lease land from the government or other vil-
lagers to engage in their livelihood. Like Milton Keynes
farmers, they face a particularly uncertain future when
the lease expires and government takes the land for
development. In several cases the local district office
has been able to lease agricultural land outside the
boundary of the new town and has provided it to the farm-
ers, but unfortunately it is impossible to meet all of
the requests to relocate farmers in other parts of the
new territories. There simply is not enough land to sup-
port all of the Sha Tin farmers, and as in Milton Keynes
most will have to learn other skills.
The fifth policy addresses squatters who have settled
in the valley. Some government officials maintain that
among all the affected groups squatters benefit most from
the new town because they are moved into public housing
Squatter village
Boat village at low tide
estates. As in Ciudad Guayana, however, squatters are
arriving faster than the government can accommodate them.
In particular, squatters and ad hoc manufacturing
operators are locating with surprising speed and density
near the existing village areas in the head of Sha Tin
Valley.
In 1976, the Sha Tin Development Office and the
District Land Office attempted to institute an experimen-
tal reception area program, similar to the one in Ciudad
Guayana, by providing two "resite areas" in the new town.
The areas were designated for officially sanctioned
squatting and provided a site, sanitary services and min-
imal building materials. The government's strategy was
to move squatters from existing shanty areas to the
resite area and finally into public housing when it be-
came available. The strategy proved to be successful,
but as in Ciudad Guayana the overall program was too
limited to provide an effective means to coordinate the
influx of new settlers.
Squatter village
Village Preservation
As the government planners in Ciudad Guayana learned,
it is difficult to ease the transition from squatter vil-
lage to resite area and finally to a flat in a housing
estate. The government's experience with relocating
squatters, farmers and villages has revealed that the
task is always expensive, sometimes violent and usually
takes more time than anticipated. Further, new village
houses must be constructed before old homes are
demolished, and if the new village is not completed in
time, the government must pay the villagers' housing ex-
penses in the interim.
Difficulties encountered with each of the five policy
alternatives, particularly high costs associated with
relocation efforts, has caused the development office to
decide that the majority of the 35 villages in the Sha
Tin Valley shall be preserved. The local villagers and
some Chinese members of the development team fear that
this policy of blanket preservation may have resulted
from the government's desire to avoid costly relocation
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in favor of leaving things the way they are in the
villages. Current government publications reinforce this
point of view by highlighting the importance of preserv-
ing the local lifestyle, culture and heritage. 1 7
Unlike Milton Keynes, the development office is
presently unconcerned with upgrading the environment in
the preserved villages. As a result some villages, par-
ticularly those that are surrounded with high density
development or industrial zones, risk becoming small, im-
poverished ghettos once the traditional forms of
livelihood are gone. Conversely, without guidance and
assistance some villages may become light industrial
areas outside immediate government control.
Because of the Hong Kong government's limited
authority over village land use, speculation by local
developers is leading to ad hoc village redevelopment.
Even though the government intends to preserve most vil-
lages, land speculation will ultimately erode traditional
patterns of ownership in many of these villages. For
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landscape
Village in develop-
ment context
example, in Tai Po a developer built 12 semi-detached, 3
story homes and sold them as condominiums on a flat by
flat basis. If redevelopment of this nature were to take
place in Tsang Tai Uk, Sha Tin's historic walled village,
the consequence would be a loss for the entire Hong Kong
community as well as the new town. Although the govern-
ment is currently allocating resources for open space
around Tsang Tai Uk, no administrative or financial ac-
tions have been directed at internally preserving the
village itself; there are no guarantees for its future.
As in Ciudad Guayana, the villagers who are able to
move to better living conditions will do so, but those
who remain may become the victims of poverty or unsafe
and unhealthy living conditions. Development of the his-
toric Kowloon City demonstrates economic impacts that can
be caused by surrounding a rural township with intensive
development without providing the local settlers with a
means to improve their immediate environment and to
stimulate commercial enterprises.
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PATTERNS OF LOCAL
INFLUENCE AND
INSTITUTIONS
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Light Industrial Zones
The Sha Tin master plan calls for balance between
planned levels of employment and the availability of
housing units. Sixty percent of all housing in Sha Tin
will be public, and forty percent will be privately
financed apartments and houses. The master plan shows
three major light industrial zones located at the east
and west ends of the new town and north of the Sha Tin
race course. In spite of the importance the planners
have placed on the balance between employment and hous-
ing, firms have been slow to relocate. Current Sha Tin
residents commute to work in Kowloon, do piecemeal as-
sembly work at home or are employed in small illegal en-
terprises at the head of Sha Tin Valley.
Whether employment will be available at the same rate
that housing is constructed is an unanswered question.
So far no new major manufacturing plants have chosen to
locate in Sha Tin. In addition to uncertainties about
the future availability of employment opportunities, the
development office planners face another potentially
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critical problem: recent environmental studies indicate
that if automobile traffic reaches predicted levels and
polluting industries locate in Sha Tin, air pollution
will become severe.
Ironically, the planners' concerns reveal a lack of
knowledge about the distribution of work throughout Hong
Kong and the New Territories. Many manufacturing and as-
sembly enterprises are decentralized; they are located in
small locally owned structures or on the first two floors
of older private housing estates. The potential for
siting small scale manufacturing enterprises within walk-
ing distance of the workers' homes is evident by looking
at existing situations in communities throughout the new
territories.
Perhaps Sha Tin planning is tied to the European no-
tion that work and industry must be centralized in in-
dustrial zones away from housing. Economic conditions in
Milton Keynes forced the planners there to consider
decentralizing some small scale manufacturing to reduce
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the worker's commuting distances. The local people in
Sha Tin are ignoring the land use map and instituting
small scale manufacturing near the housing estates and
villages. Their actions are already influencing the
development -- business activity abounds in locations
contrary to the plan.
Although an important component of the Sha Tin
development process is to provide neighborhood schools,
health and recreational facilities, the Sha Tin plan, un-
like Milton Keynes, addresses physical space and con-
struction rather than social development programs. By
providing the appropriate physical facilities for social
welfare activities, the planners hope that the voluntary
and charitable organizations (which traditionally provide
most Hong Kong social services) will step in to deliver
the necessary services. Attempts to ensure that the ser-
vices will be provided at a level that meets demand are
not as comprehensive or coordinated as the efforts
underway in Milton Keynes.
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Local Organization As in Ciudad Guayana, however, the local people are
beginning to organize and influence the actions of the
development office because of problems in making the
transition from the rural setting to an urban environ-
ment. In the South China Morning Post a village leader,
Tsang Ying-Chung, expressed his opinion of the develop-
ment office's attitude toward the villagers' concerns.
Mr. Tsang said, "I am proud of our past and even prouder
to see a glorious future for Sha Tin. But I think it un-
wise that the government will not consider the views of
those who, after all, have lived on and been developing
that piece of land for generations, land of mine and my
fellow Shatinians."18
In an effort to make village needs known, a delega-
tion including Sha Tin residents visited London to dis-
cuss the future welfare of people in the New Territories
with British government leaders. As the Heung Yee Kuk
delegation argued, if the population of the New
Territories doubles by 1985, as projected, "better water
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and power supplies, medical services, educational
facilities and other amenities are urgently needed."19
This plea for direct contact with the government in
London and greater local control in the New Territories
not only achieved the desired close contact with Great
Britain but resulted in plans by the Kuk to keep a per-
manent office in London.
When the planning and development office sponsored a
symposium in 1976 to address social service planning,
government and academic speakers offered a range of views
on the nature of the project and ways to improve social
services and health care delivery in the new town. The
chief planner for Sha Tin stated that, "The aim of Sha
Tin is not only to provide 500,000 people with satisfac-
tory homes and employment, but also to encourage the for-
mation of a healthy and balanced community where the
basic needs of all its residents can readily be met: an
identifiable and meaningful community in which people of
all ages and incomes can live and develop healthily and
socially. ,20
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Local Government Needs However, most of the independent speakers stressed
the need for more frequent communication between the
government planning officials and the local residents.
One researcher made three recommendations aimed at creat-
ing more cohesive social organizations at the community
level:
1. Both government and public agencies should mobi-
lize and organize the new residents to speed up
the natural formation of primary groups and
voluntary organizations which constitute a con-
current, solid and stable community.
2. Government must link and coordinate these primary
groups and organizations to form a solidary so-
cial network. This network in turn is the basis
for promoting community cooperation, fostering
community spirit, controlling crime and institut-
ing a responsible political infrastructure.
3. Physical facilities and carefully designed social
welfare p5Tgrams must be provided to enhance this
process.
The researcher went on to say that community develop-
ment especially at the grass roots level has significant
role to play in Hong Kong and that government should
initiate community development and participation rather
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CONCLUSION
than make sporadic responses to local frustration. The
experience of this native born Hong Kong researcher was
that lccal people are willing to participate in planning
and guiding their community's future if they know their
efforts will bring results.
In the fall of 1977, the Sha Tin Development Office
was building the new town according to the programmed
master plan. Perhaps because of cultural differences or
the overwhelming mandate to complete the project, opposi-
tion expressed by immigrants and the villagers was having
little effect on overall planning decisions. In spite of
recommendations made at the symposium on social planning,
there were no sociologists or Chinese community develop-
ment specialists on the development team. However, there
was growing concern for the villages on the part of
several Chinese planners and architects in the
Development Office. The Sha Tin planners and designers
continued to make strategic decisions in a vacuum:
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although the office was located on the project site,
those in control of the development remained isolated
from the farmers, villagers and squatters. Site visits
were made for engineering purposes, not to make contact
or enhance communication with villagers or squatters.
Like Ciudad Guayana, these early years of formal
planning and development have highlighted contradictions
between the professional's view of the city and the more
immediate needs of the local population. The profes-
sional staff in both Sha Tin and Ciudad Guayana are par-
ternalistic toward the local residents. Both teams
operated as though the villagers, settlers, and squatters
are not educated enough or familiar enough with massive
engineering works to contribute in a constructive way.
Local government in Sha Tin found that it was easier
to influence project decisions by going directly to the
highest power: the British government in London. As in
Ciudad Guayana, there was no effective means for the
villagers to communicate the need for on site services
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except through protest. At times in Sha Tin
confrontations with disgruntled villagers were violent
and police were needed to clear land or resolve disputes.
While the Hong Kong economy remains strong, the in-
flux of squatters and unanticipated light industrial ac-
tivity may affect locational decisions of needed inves-
tors. Most high income residents in Hong Kong live away
from impoverished squatter settlements and may not wish
to live in Sha Tin if there are immediate local problems.
There could be an emerging conflict between the
government's new town vision and the reality at the site,
and as in Ciudad Guayana the development office may have
to solve these immediate problems in order to realize
their future goals.
So far the Sha Tin plan is a master plan in the
truest sense. Roadways, infrastructure and land use par-
cels are fixed; many are under construction. There is
little room in the plan for substantial change. The
planners and designers have not analyzed what to do
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should the social or economic climate of Sha Tin change.
Already there is growing concern about what to do about
the potential air pollution problems. Contingencies are
not built into the system as they were in Milton Keynes
and will be difficult to institute within the plan's
rigid structure.
Sha Tin developers made the same decisions about
preserving local towns and villages as the Milton Keynes
professionals did. The rationale, however, seems dif-
ferent. Milton Keynes designers tried to weave the
fabric of the new town within and between the villages;
in Sha Tin the town seems to be designed in spite of the
villages. A look at the Sha Tin land use map reveals
several situations where a village's location conflicts
with surrounding uses.
The mandate to develop Ciudad Guayana was based on
the desire to develop natural resources. The mandate to
develop Milton Keynes grew from a long term regional
planning process to accommodate urban growth between
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New development - villages
in background
London and Birmingham. Sha Tin's mandate is the
recognized need to house Hong Kong's population. Even
though the ultimate population targets differ, all three
projects have been analyzed at a time just after the
first influx of residents; each project had between
40,000 and 50,000 residents. Hopefully, it is possible
to learn from the experience in Ciudad Guayana and Milton
Keynes for the benefit of the Development Office in Sha
Tin.
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Chapter 6:
Three Villages
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INTRODUCTION This chapter outlines strategies for resolving
problems with three Sha Tin villages. The first village,
Tsang Tai Uk, was selected to illuminate problems and op-
portunities experienced when preserving a village in its
existing location. The second village, Tin Sam, was
chosen to illustrate how a village can be redeveloped
with the villagers participating in the transition and
financial outcome. Finally, Wong Uk village gives ex-
amples of complexities encountered when relocating a vil-
lage to another site.
My decisions to recommend preserving, relocating or
redeveloping these three villages grew out of published
information gathered from the Sha Tin Development Office
(engineering reports and landscape planning data) and my
experience while working in Hong Kong. There is no
decentral process for village level decision making in
the new town development system. Evaluating the Sha Tin
outline master plan illuminates contradictions in
locational logic -- two of the three villages were
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clearly out of context with the proposed new town
structure.
Cultural preservation issues were considered because
of the government's objective of preserving the vil-
lagers' lifestyle, culture and heritage. Clearly, cul-
ture and lifestyle have a far better chance of being
preserved if a village is moved to a rural location,
rather than being retained in the urban core.
The strategies and recommendations for guiding the
village's transition are structured in response to ques-
tions asked in the assessment of Milton Keynes, Ciudad
Guayana and Sha Tin New Town. The suggestions look at
ways to structure interactions between professionals in
the development office and the local villagers.
The recommendations will also address problems with
land occupancy based on an understanding of the vil-
lagers' historic relationship to the land. In Tin Sam
recommendations are also made for squatters occupying
land near the village.
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Finally, this chapter suggests what local
institutional needs are evident within each village. In
some cases the suggestions are in the form of procedural
or organizational steps that should be taken by the vil-
lagers and the development office. As these processes
mature it may be necessary to institute committees to
take responsibility to ensure that the steps are taken
efficiently and effectively.
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TSANG TAI UK - PRESERVATION
\/
Tsang Tai Uk - Surrounding
development
Of all the villages in Sha Tin Valley designated to
be preserved, perhaps-the most important is Tsang Tai Uk.
This village retains special historic significance be-
cause it was constructed early in the 19th century short-
ly after the British began to rule Hong Kong. Unlike any
other village in the valley, Tsang Tai Uk is a walled
village reflecting traditional Chinese city form.
Government publications note that the village is the best
preserved walled village in Hong Kong. Further, Hong
Kong has ample administrative laws to protect historic
structures.
The walled village is rectangular, approximately 300
feet (100 meters) long and 150 feet (50 meters) wide, and
the walls are tall enough to accommodate a two story
development. In 1976 it appeared that there were 600-800
people living in some 100 to 150 apartments and houses
within the village walls. The village is located on the
south side of the valley below the road leading from Lion
Rock Tunnel.
Tsang Tai Uk
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Interactions Between the
Professionals and the
Local People
The Sha Tin Development Office has recognized the
role that the village can and already does play as a
tourist attraction in the new town. In late 1976 the
development office had allocated ample open space in
front of Tsang Tai Uk to provide for recreational
amenities and to accommodate parking for tourists. The
village was in need of renovation, and engineering work
was underway to solve flooding problems. However, no ac-
tions had been taken to negotiate directly with the vil-
lagers or to preserve the integrity of the physical
structure. The villagers did not know that their role in
the new town was to become a tourist attraction.
The development office should form a team to work
with the village leaders to insure that the villagers un-
derstand and are prepared for their changing role in Sha
Tin. The development professionals and the villagers
should agree on what work is necessary to improve the ex-
isting buildings. They should also decide how to
accommodate any necessary expansion and work together to
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bring Tsang Tai Uk within the protection of historic
preservation laws.
The team representing the development office should
contain the skills necessary to communicate with the lo-
cal villagers. The team must also be able to help or-
ganize a representative group from the village and work
with the central Hong Kong government to secure the his-
toric status of the village. This team should be com-
posed of:
--An architect with particular knowledge of or expertise
in architectural history and Chinese city form;
--A planner who speaks Chinese and who is knowledgeable
about Hong Kong's preservation laws;
--An engineer who is the professional that has handled
the site preparation work thus far;
--A land specialist from the district land office who
knows the status of home ownership within the walled
village; and
--A "development specialist" with experience in working
at the community level, preferably one who has worked
with villagers in the past. This team member may come
from the district office or from the Chinese
University.
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The villagers should be represented by their elders
and immediate leaders together with representatives elec-
ted to sit on the district rural council. Other vil-
lagers concerned with the status of homes within the vil-
lage should also be on the village team. The village and
the development office should agree on a date and place
for a formal meeting between the village representatives
and the development office team. The first formal meet-
ing should be devoted to exchanging information about the
future of the village as envisioned by the development
office and reviewing problems that the villagers current-
ly experience or perceive they will experience as Sha Tin
is developed around the village.
Subsequent meetings should address the need for and
timing of physical improvements. The development office
team should also take the lead in helping the villagers
plan and prepare for expanding the village. Expanding
Tsang Tai Uk will be particularly sensitive because of
the need to preserve historic qualities of the walled
village.
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Local Relationship to
the Land
The development office team can provide the villagers
with educational information about the new town. The
team can illuminate the villagers' future and their new
economic role in Sha Tin. The role of the professionals
should also include helping to express the interests of
the villagers in development office decisions. Most im-
portantly, the development office team should provide
professional expertise to the village at the request of
the representatives. The professionals should support
the villagers' desire to overcome administrative and
legal obstacles when dealing with the government.
Tsang Tai Uk is the home of descendents of a man
named Tsang. The village was originally founded over 120
years ago as a rural retreat from the urban settlements
in Hong Kong and Kowloon. The land adjacent to the vil-
lage has traditionally been farmed in low lying rice
paddies.
If the village structure is not protected by historic
preservation laws, it is probable that ad hoc
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redevelopment will destroy the historic qualities that
make the village attractive. It is unclear whether the
villagers understand their changing economic role in Sha
Tin or their changing relationship to the land. They are
losing one source of livelihood (agriculture) and are as-
suming a different way of life (tourism).
In 1976 the villagers were not engaging in agricul-
tural activity on land in front of and along side the
village. The paddies were drained and a few water buf-
falo were grazing on a small amount of grass that had
grown. The villagers seemed already to be engaged in
tourism or had found other means of employment.
Since the village already had become something of a
tourist attraction without resistance from the villagers,
the transition from agriculture to alternate ways of
making a living is underway. However, it is apparent
that some villagers may have problems making the transi-
tion because they lack job skills. The development
office should help the village initiate a training
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program through the Hong Kong social welfare department
or private business in the new town.
Because the treaty with China allows sons of village
elders to have homes within village boundaries, Tsang Tai
Uk may need space for expansion. In 1976 there were no
immediate occupancy problems with squatters or illegal
industrial enterprises, and it appeared that local en-
forcement was successful in keeping adjacent land clear
for site improvements and recreational development.
Should expansion space be required by the villagers
during negotiations with the development office team, ad-
ditional space will have to be found near Tsang Tai Uk to
accommodate the growth. It appears from a site evalua-
tion that there is room for the village to grow on the
rear site toward the nearby hill. Providing for growth
in this direction preserves the integrity of the walled
form and allows necessary expansion. Alternately, in-
dividual houses may be sited on the nearby hillside
without intruding visually or contradicting the scale of
the walled structure.
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Local Institutional Needs
A physical layout plan for the village extension area
should be prepared. The layout should show the specific
land uses, the arrangement and location of structures and
should detail a phasing plan for implementing improve-
ments. The group representing the village should guide
and review the preparation of the layout plan for Tsang
Tai Uk. The plan should also encompass the existing vil-
lage area and outline a strategy for physically upgrading
sanitary and housing conditions.
One of the initial problems that the development of-
fice and the village representatives should address is
the appropriate strategy for preserving the physical in-
tegrity of the walled village. However, once there is
consensus between the village representatives and the
development office that Tsang Tai Uk is to be preserved
as a tourist attraction, then the villagers can play an
integral role in ensuring that the intended preservation
takes place.
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The first step should be to protect the village
through Hong Kong's historic preservation laws. However,
the village representatives should understand implica-
tions of the law for redevelopment and rehabilitation of
the village. The development office team can be in-
strumental in assisting the villagers in applying to the
Hong Kong Historical Society for historical building
status. After the village is on the historic register,
most of the necessary enforcement can take place within
the village itself.
Perhaps the best means toward this end is for the
village representatives to review proposals for village
improvement. A set of preservation guidelines should be
developed so that any changes or improvements to the vil-
lage reflect the traditional architectural form. When
necessary, the group could play a coordinating role with
the Historical Society, the Hong Kong government and the
Sha Tin Development Office by reviewing redevelopment and
preservation proposals.
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Options for growth and rehabilitation should be
explored by the development office team together with the
village representatives, and there should be mutual
agreement on preferred strategies. Physical improve-
ments, including drainage and sewer connections, should
be identified and scheduled for capital expenditure im-
provements. The 1976 engineering report identified some
physical improvements, however it was unclear who would
incur the cost or whether the village agreed that the
list of necessary improvements was in the correct order
of priority.
The village representatives, working with the rural
council, could also help the district land office coor-
dinate housing transfers within the walled village it-
self. Should homes be sold or transferred to other vil-
lagers, the villagers could help insure that the physical
space is maintained and improved within the overall set
of preservation guidelines.
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Finally, the village representatives and the develop-
ment office team should develop a strategy for managing
Tsang Tai Uk as a tourist attraction. The groups should
address how income can be generated from tourism through
concession sales and should define what areas of the vil-
lage are off limits to tourists. The groups should also
decide how the village is to be policed in the future and
how the recreational and parking areas are to be managed.
The villagers should know whether they can charge ad-
mission to visitors and should establish what is the most
beneficial mix of concession sales to be offered. More
importantly, the development office and the villagers
must agree on who should manage and derive revenue from
parking facilities and recreational areas adjacent to the
village. The villagers should have a role in managing
these areas and should receive income from them as a form
of compensation for lost land.
The village representatives should develop a strategy
for internally distributing the revenue generated from
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Conclusion
tourism. For instance, the village could either divide
the income on a per capita basis or establish a
development fund from which payment is drawn for those
who work for the tourist operations. The balance of this
fund could be retained for on-site improvements and in-
vested for the benefit of the village as a whole.
Tsang Tai Uk should retain its physical position in
the development and has an economic role to play in Sha
Tin New Town. Squatting and uncontrolled light in-
dustrial activity are not problems in the area. Further
the villagers seem content with the village becoming a
tourist attraction. The villagers can, however, play an
integral role in the development of Tsang Tai Uk as a
preserved entity.
It is important to enhance the relationship between
the development office professionals and village
representatives. By structuring positive negotiations
with the villagers and by providing an open avenue for
information about the new town development, the
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with the villagers and by providing an open avenue for
information about the new town development, the
development office can benefit from enhanced local
management. The villagers, on the other hand, should
take the necessary steps to insure that preserving Tsang
Tai Uk will result in decisions that are economically
beneficial to the village.
Addressing preservation and growth issues in Tsang
Tai Uk should result in building local capacity to
provide for enhanced development decisions and local
management. The villagers should take the lead in
developing guidelines to review proposals for improving
or upgrading the village. They could also help the
development office schedule and approve capital
improvements.
The village representatives should guide the prepara-
tion of a physical plan for extending Tsang Tai Uk. The
representatives can play an integral role in deciding in
which direction the village should grow and in siting
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individual houses near Tsang Tai Uk. The elders and
elected representatives of the village should also
negotiate with the development office team to arrive at a
strategy for managing the adjacent land.
Structuring local institutions to address issues that
include village preservation, income generation and dis-
tribution, and management of the adjacent land should
result in a development area that the villagers are will-
ing to maintain because it is in their financial interest
to do so. Ultimately, Tsang Tai Uk should become less of
a burden on Sha Tin because the management and preserva-
tion enforcement can be accomplished locally.
130
TIN SAM TSUEN -
REDEVELOPMENT
Tin Sam Tsuen -
Surrounding development
Tin Sam Tsuen village provides a prime example of a
village that will be out of context with the surrounding
new town development. Tin Sam is located at the head of
Sha Tin Valley on the south side of the tidal cove, and
should it be preserved, the village would be surrounded
on three sides by high density (10 to 20 story) public
housing and on the fourth side by a light industrial
zone. The village is medium sized by Sha Tin standards.
There appears to be 60-70 individual structures, and the
population is estimated to be at least 1000 people.
Government publications originally listed this vil-
lage as being scheduled for relocation because of primary
road works and the adjacent high density public housing.
However, a 1976 engineering report noted that because
there were problems with finding a suitable resite area
the village should be retained. The land that Tin Sam
occupies is suited to denser residential or commercial
development related to the surrounding housing estates.
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Interactions Between the
Professionals and the
Local People
Tin Sam Tsuen
For Tin Sam the available policy choices should ex-
tend beyond preservation or relocation. The options
should include the opportunity to redevelop Tin Sam in
cooperation with the villagers.
Because Tin Sam is located in an area that is
strategically appropriate for higher density development,
the village runs the risk of becoming an impoverished
ghetto or an unofficial light industrial zone if it is
preserved. Early in 1977 several illegal industries were
already operating in the village area, some of which were
becoming safety and environmental hazards. A rattan.fac-
tory had no fire fighting equipment at all and an auto
repair shop was spilling waste oil, damaging nearby com-
mercial fruit trees.
In spite of these conditions, the development office
decided that the most appropriate strategy was to
preserve Tin Sam and not recognize that the land was al-
ready in transition. Redevelopment was taking place in
response to the economic pressures on the value of the
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land -- the villagers had decided to put their land to a
more productive use.
The Sha Tin development office can build on this lo-
cal initiative by structuring a process to redevelop Tin
Sam with the villagers participating in planning for the
transition and in the financial outcome. Since land
values as far back as 1977 indicated that the area is
ripe for redevelopment, the government should rezone the
land and offer the villagers joint development rights.
In forming a team of professionals to work with Tin
Sam villagers, the development office should assign ex-
pertise similar to the team formed for Tsang Tai Uk.
Instead of retaining an architect experienced in history
and preservation, however, the team will require exper-
tise in the procedural and financial aspects of develop-
ment. Other expertise -- planning, engineering, and land
transfers and community development specialists -- should
remain the same.
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The villagers should have broad representation in-
cluding village elders and leaders, and representatives
to the district rural committee. Representatives of home
owners in Tin Sam and representatives of the light in-
dustrial enterprises should also be included on the Tin
Sam team.
Once both the village and development office teams
are assembled, the groups can set an agenda on issues
requiring negotiation. The first step is to outline a
range of options for the future development of Tin Sam.
Alternatives for consideration may range from expanding
the light industrial activity (with the area becoming a
legitimate small scale light industrial zone) to creating
a commercial shopping center that connects to adjacent
housing estates. Tin Sam may even be redeveloped into a
medium density commercial housing area.
Although the current activity indicates the villagers
have adopted light industrial activity, the development
office may think the more appropriate use is residential
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development. Alternatively, developing a commercial
shopping center may bridge some of these problems and
provide high income to the developers of the project.
Once a preferred option is identified the groups
should agree on an overall phasing plan to guide the vil-
lage's transition. The phasing plan should address such
broad issues as the appropriate timing for offering
development options to staging for the land clearance.
However, the phasing plan should also detail a coor-
dinated strategy for redevelopment that ensures that vil-
lagers are not left homeless during and after construc-
tion. The Hong Kong government can be instrumental in
assisting the villagers during this transition period by
offering low interest loans repayable from the proceeds
of the villagers' interest in a transformed Tin Sam.
After the groups have agreed to what kind of of
development is appropriate for Tin Sam and a phasing plan
is set, they should achieve consensus on a strategy for
acquiring and distributing revenue from the redevelopment
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project. The mechanism for administering the villagers'
interest in the development can be a Community
Development Corporation described in the section on local
institutional needs. Sha Tin villagers by law must
receive fair compensation for losing village land. Fair
compensation can be achieved through a market mechanism
if the villagers retain joint development rights in the
new development.
The relationship between the development office
professionals and villagers from Tin Sam should be one in
which the professionals support the existing
entrepreneurial skills evident in the village. As in
Milton Keynes, the planners and designers should help the
local people improve their existing environments and
structure economic links to the surrounding communities.
Conflicts between the existing village and the new
development can be resolved and the development office
team can assist the Tin Sam villagers in continuing the
redevelopment that started in 1977.
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Local Relationship to
the Land
Tin Sam is not the oldest village in the valley,
having grown after World War II when there was an influx
of Chinese people from China into the New Territories.
Traditionally, the villagers were farmers on the paddy
land which surrounded the village. However, the rice
production declined as the villagers turned to growing
commercial flowers and ornamental trees because these
crops were more lucrative.
With the development of Sha Tin New Town most of the
agricultural land near Tin Sam was taken for road works
and public housing. The villagers responded to the con-
struction activity in the same way that rice farming was
converted to more valuable crops; they opened small com-
mercial and light industrial operations to maintain in-
comes. In Tin Sam agriculture ultimately gave way to
small scale manufacturing and industrialization. These
transitions indicate that the villagers accepted their
new economic activity; it was the development office that
thought the village should remain as it always had been.
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Local Institutional Needs
The construction works and development activity on
Sha Tin resulted in limited squatting near Tin Sam, most
likely because there were job opportunities in the vil-
lage. In 1977 the squatting seemed to be contained on
the east side of Tin Sam near the roadway construction.
The squatter settlement should be included in the
phasing plan for redevelopment because it is an important
aspect of land in transition and Sha Tin's urban form.
The development office professionals and the village
representatives should discuss what role the squatters
should play in Tin Sam's redevelopment scheme. The
squatters were providing a source of labor for manufac-
turing activities underway in 1977, and their labor may
be required in future years. From the point of view of
the development office the area may be suitable for an
official squatter location in the new town.
As the development office and the village representa-
tives form a strategy to accomplish the redevelopment,
there will need to be an institutional mechanism to guide
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the development process and to distribute proceeds from
the resulting development. As stated previously, the
most equitable and profitable means toward redevelopment
may be for the Sha Tin development office to offer both
the villagers and private entrepreneurs joint development
rights in the intended development project.
A village development corporation could be the repre-
sentative organization within the village to coordinate
redevelopment. This organizational structure enables
legal and administrative functions of a joint venture to
take place in the village. The village corporation
should take the lead in determining whose rights in the
village are honored and at what rate they will be valued.
A system similar to the letter B development entitle-
ments could be applied within the village so that land
owners are compensated from the development corporation
in proportion to the market value of the land.
Alternatively, as in Tsang Tai Uk, interests in the new
development could be divided along clan or family lines
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or could be distributed on a per capita basis. The
objective is to design an equitable disbursement system,
but the villagers themselves should take the initiative
in defining what is equitable.
The final duty that the village group should address
is to institute a process for guiding individual family
relocation. The development corporation can be effective
in coordinating these transitions by working with the
Hong Kong housing authority, the district land office and
the Sha Tin development office. Making the transition
between a traditional village environment and new housing
estate is rarely easy; it is often time consuming, con-
fusing and difficult. The development corporation, aided
by the development office team, should contact the social
welfare department to provide assistance to families in
need of counseling, medical attention or assistance to
ease these difficulties.
Conclusion Studying a land use map for Sha Tin New Town reveals
that Tin Sam is not in scale with the proposed surround-
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ing development. A village the size of Tin Sam is out of
context with light industry and high density public hous-
ing. Further, the villagers themselves recognized the
changes and responded to these opportunities by opening
illegal small scale manufacturing enterprises.
In spite of the lack of a suitable location to resite
the village on another location, the development office
and the villagers can cooperatively redevelop Tin Sam.
It is uncertain whether the villagers will agree with any
redevelopment proposal; what is certain is that they are
already willing to convert a substantial portion of the
village and that the development office did not approve
of the ad hoc redevelopment taking place in 1977.
The villagers can play an integral role in the future
physical and economic development process. It is criti-
cal to structure a positive link between the village and
the development office by forming a team of professionals
with diverse skills to negotiate with representatives
from the village. These meetings should result in
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decisions that benefit both the new town developers and
the villagers. It will also be necessary to structure
local institutions to address development timing, phasing
and distribution of finances. A community development
corporation can provide the necessary administrative or-
ganization to make decisions about land rights and local
compensation and can aid in relocating village families.
If the group representing the village and the
development office team negotiate openly and if the
development office team is willing to assist the vil-
lagers technically, decisions about Tin Sam should be
productive and appropriate to the needs of both groups.
More importantly, the redevelopment process could become
a precedent for organizing development and arriving at a
means for compensating villagers in other parts of the
new town.
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WONG UK - RELOCATION
Wong Uk - Surrounding
development
Wong Uk is a small village located at the foot of
Yuen Chau Kok, an important Fung Shui mountain in Sha
Tin. The exact age and population of the village is un-
known, but the houses in the village appear to be 20 to
30 years old, and in 1977 about 100 to 200 people lived
in the village. Wong Uk occupies an area approximately
825 feet (250 meters) long and 165 feet (50 meters) wide,
while 15 to 20 village structures are well integrated
into the landscape of Yuen Chau Kok. Near the village is
a burial ground located on the back side of the hill.
This village is targeted in the master plan for
relocation because of its small size and conflicts with
the surrounding development. The development office has
filled in the tidal basin fronting the village, and there
will be 15 to 20 story private housing constructed on the
new land. High density private housing estates will also
be developed immediately to the right of the village
site. The Yuen Chau Kok mountain will remain an open
space in Sha Tin new town.
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. MEME
Interactions Between the
Professionals and the
Local People
Wong Uk
In 1977 the development office and district land of-
fice had contacted the villagers to begin negotiations
for moving the village. These discussions indicated that
the villagers were willing to move if new houses were
provided. However, the villagers disagreed with the num-
ber of new houses that the government offered.
The Sha Tin Development Office and District Land
Office have had extensive prior experience with relocat-
ing villages. Early negotiations with the villagers
revealed that there was agreement that Wong Uk should be
moved; where to move the village had not been decided and
how many new homes to build was disputed. The develop-
ment office should form a team with the district land of-
fice to negotiate with the villagers and to provide
professional expertise to resolve problems around house
construction and siting. The team from the development
office should include:
--an engineer who is familiar with site preparation work
for village resite areas;
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--a representative from the district land office who has
worked with Wong Uk villagers;
--a Chinese speaking planner from the development office
who is familiar with available alternate sites for vil-
lage development;
--a Fung Shui expert who can aid in the resiting of in-
dividual homes and the burial grounds; and
--an architect who can prepare site design alternatives
and communicate with villagers.
Since Wong Uk is so small, the traditional elders and
elected leaders may be sufficient to represent the vil-
lagers; however because resiting the village may have im-
plications for other Sha Tin villages, Wong Uk's repre-
sentative to the rural council should also be a member of
the team. The village's size creates the opportunity to
review site plans in village-wide open meetings when
broad consensus is required for making decisions.
Once the villagers have agreed to a date and time to
meet with the development office team, the group should
resolve problems with the number of houses the government
is willing to construct. Regulations allow the
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government to provide replacement houses at the rate of
one house for each 0.01 acre of land taken for
development. If the result of this formula is to reduce
the total housing stock within the village, the develop-
ment office should consider replacing the total number of
houses.
If that is impossible, the government could provide
basic shells for the additional houses requested and al-
low the villagers to complete the house. This process
could resemble that of a self-help housing project; the
expense to the government is minimized and the occupant
gets credit for labor needed to complete the house.
Another option which builds on local entrepreneurial
skills is to provide extra land in the village resite
area for additional housing. A villager could then con-
struct additional houses to sell or transfer to other
villagers. This added income to the village may be taken
as a form of compensation for moving the village.
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After agreeing to the number of houses to be provided
in the new village, the groups should evaluate options
for resiting the village. Expertise from the Fung Shui
master and the development office planner will be
required, because the location of the burial grounds and
the orientation of the village as a whole is critical.
It would be beneficial at this stage to organize open
meetings in the village so that all concerned villagers
have an oppcrtunity to review and comment on the siting
alternatives.
After agreeing to a location for Tin Sam, the next
step should be to site the individual houses. The ar-
chitect and the fung shui master should play primary
roles when working with villagers to locate houses on the
new Tin Sam location. These professionals should coor-
dinate choices for house location and community buildings
with the engineer so that water and sewer infrastructure
may be constructed.
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The development office professionals should meet
individually with home owners at this stage to resolve
any locational or orientation problems. In addition, the
architect and fung shui expert should meet with groups of
families because of fung shui complexities or because
families may wish to cluster their houses.
Finally, a phasing plan for moving the village should
be detailed so that the villagers can see that there will
be new homes available before the old village is taken
for development. The transition for the village can be
eased if the team of professionals help insure that the
process of moving is well coordinated and timed with on-
going development activities. The plan should outline
each step that will have to be taken to move individual
homes and all community structures, and the professionals
should involve the villagers in creating the plan so
there is clear understanding of any difficulties that may
occur.
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Local Relationship to
the Land
Since the site for Wong Uk is small and borders the
Fung Shui hill, there were no immediate problems with
squatting or illegal light industry in 1977. Since the
village had existed for approximately 30 years, the vil-
lagers, like most villagers in Sha Tin, probably derived
their livelihood from farming and fishing. However, by
late 1976 the cove in front of the village was reclaimed
and site preparation work was underway for the residen-
tial development planned for the area. The villagers had
begun the transition from a rural lifestyle to urban
existence.
The major problem in Wong Uk will be to accommodate
the necessary fung shui aspects of site planning to
resite the village and burial grounds in an appropriate
location. These local beliefs involving the villager's
relationship to the land; spirits must be respected.
When siting a house or moving into a new apartment,
the spirits associated with these elements must be
consulted so that the residents will have good fortune
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and successful livelihoods. As
learned in the early stages of
must be integral to the process
When designing the phasing plan,
sary to allow time for the
ceremonies to take place when
moved.
the development office
Sha Tin, these factors
of relocating villages.
it will also be neces-
appropriate rites and
the burial grounds are
If it is possible to accommodate, the new village
site should allow space for farming. Few villagers in
the Sha Tin valley were growing rice in the late 1960's
because most had found that income was greater from grow-
ing commercial flowers and ornamental and fruit trees.
If the village is to be resited on the hillside south of
Sha Tin, it may be possible to allow space for these
forms of agriculture because these crops require less
space than rice paddies do and can be grown on small
hillside terraces. Maintaining as much of the tradition-
al ways of life as possible will ease the villager's
transition and may result in an easier site selection
process.
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Local Institutional Needs Because Wong Uk is a small village, the group that
represents the villagers should be able to be the primary
negotiators with the team from the development office.
But the village team should be supported with open meet-
ings for the entire village. Unlike Tin Sam, there is no
need to form a Community Development Corporation; it is
however, important to institute a process that enhances
and facilitates village wide consensus.
All villagers who hold land and houses in Wong Uk
have a stake in the outcome of site location decisions
and should have the opportunity to approve the general
location of the village as well as help site individual
homes or groups of homes. It is therefore important for
the professionals to delineate options for the village to
consider; the options can be reviewed and evaluated at
open village meetings.
Early village wide meetings should achieve consensus
around the general location for Wong Uk and later open
meetings should set the specific site orientation of the
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village. Options that are presented at these meetings
should illuminate the positive as well as negative
aspects of the site; dialogue during the meetings should
result in consensus decisions.
Finally, the group representing the village should
address relocation issues similar to Tin Sam because it
is important to schedule the timing between construction
of the new houses and demolition of the old structures.
If the development office needs the village land before
the new homes are constructed, then the Hong Kong Housing
Authority will be required to find and pay for temporary
accommodations. The transition may be easier if there is
a a group within the village that helps resolve these
problems and coordinate activities involved with moving
the households.
Conclusion Wong Uk is in conflict with the proposed surrounding
development, and in 1977 the Sha Tin Development Office
and the District Land Office had initiated consultations
with the villagers about relocating the village. The
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villagers were in agreement about the need to move the
village, but there was disagreement around the number of
houses that the villagers would receive as compensation
for losing their land.
The development office should form an interdiscipli-
nary team to continue talks with the villagers.
Compensating the villagers on a house for house basis or
instituting a self-help housing program in Wong Uk may
resolve the disagreements that initially halted the
process. The team from the development office should
build on past experience with relocating villages by
employing fung shui experts and by reviewing options for
relocating the village at open meetings. Instituting
such an open process for making relocation decisions may
result in decisions that are more
derstood by the villagers.
The villagers should be led by
that links to the District Rural
team should coordinate relocation
timely and better un-
a representative team
Council. The village
and siting decisions
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with other members of the Rural Council representing
villages near the chosen relocation site.
The key to a more harmonious relocation process lies
in professional recognition of traditional beliefs and
respect for the graves of village ancestors. It is
especially important in this instance to support the
villagers' desire to achieve the best location for the
new village and to retain, as far as possible, their
traditional life styles and ways of making a living.
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SUMMARY The Sha Tin Development Office and the District Land
Office should work with Sha Tin villagers on the suggest-
ed strategies for preserving, relocating or transforming
the villages. The objective should be to offset short,
medium and long range impacts affecting the villages.
The strategy should include: (1) identifying employment
opportunities; (2) upgrading the villages to be preser-
ved; (3) accommodating shifts in land use; and (4)
redeveloping of some existing village areas. Key ele-
ments involved in implementing such a strategy include
revising the Sha Tin development plan, preparing a physi-
cal layout plan for village extension areas, and com-
municating with village residents. Interim measures
(such as connections to utility service) and long term
actions (such as instituting community development cor-
porations) should be taken to guide the villages to en-
sure that they will be preserved in a way that comple-
ments the new town as well as the village.
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Local employment patterns will shift when the vil-
lagers are no longer able to farm in the Sha Tin Valley.
Employment opportunities for these villagers will be
limited, especially for those who are unaccustomed to
modern mechanization and industrial organization.
Typically, unskilled workers engage in small scale
manufacturing or assembly activities. The Social Welfare
Department should be contacted to assist residents who
cannot enter the job market. Training courses in nearby
industries should be structured to help upgrade this
labor force.
Certain types of nonpolluting cottage industries
should be planned and encouraged. Cottage industries can
link to nearby light manufacturing through packaging,
sewing, prefabricating, or constructing components.
Cottage industry of this kind is already widespread
throughout Hong Kong and does not seem to disrupt living
conditions or social patterns. This development can be
encouraged in village extension areas, since the
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entrepreneurial activity will benefit the villagers as
well as the local industries.
Finally, a top development priority should be to up-
grade sanitary conditions in the preserved villages.
Some villages lack sanitary facilities completely, and
most village houses lack separate kitchens and running
water. Open sewers often pose severe health problems.
Sha Tin will be the first development in Hong Kong to
have central sewage treatment, and the villages that are
preserved should be connected. In the short run these
facilities could be provided at a central location in the
village, and in the long run the village improvement plan
should provide water and sewer connections to each home.
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Chapter 7:
Conclusion And Recommendations
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CASE COMPARISONS The Ciudad Guayana and Milton Keynes cases reveal the
importance of accommodating the needs of the indigenous
population at the project site and integrating new im-
migrants into the development. The cases illustrate dif-
ferent approaches to working with the local settlers to
coordinate the transition from rural to urban
environments.
The Milton Keynes case illuminates the relationship
between the professionals and local settlers. The case
shows that it is possible to structure frequent and posi-
tive interactions between professionals and local people
at the project site. The Ciudad Guayana case illustrates
issues in the relationship between the indigenous people
and the land. This case describes complexities encoun-
tered when large numbers of squatters immigrated to
Ciudad Guayana.
Taken together, these studies reveal the patterns of
influence and describe institutional relationships at the
local level of government. Ciudad Guayana had
rudimentary municipal and local government institutions
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that were not coordinated with development decisions.
Milton Keynes was developed in a political economy in
which local institutions and government offices were well
staffed and highly integrated into public decision
making. Development decisions for Milton Keynes were
reviewed and approved by several local entities and
citizens at each stage of the planning effort.
In Ciudad Guayana the government learned that its ef-
forts were often thwarted because Carracas based master
plans failed to coincide with conditions at the project
site. Immigration far exceeded the planners' expecta-
tions, squatting was rampant and most immigrants con-
tinued to follow traditional development patterns.
Because the planners failed to solve development problems
by preparing physical master plans 300 miles from the
site, the government ultimately learned it had to open a
local development office in Ciudad Guayana and began
working to resolve more immediate problems. The develop-
ment process became somewhat smoother once the Venezuelan
planners learned to accommodate needs of the local
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Case Study Outcomes
settlers rather than to expect that the master plan it-
self would create the new city.
In Milton Keynes local participation and consultation
on development decisions was by design. The government
involved both the existing population and immigrating
people from the outset. The planners were able to change
the design of the plan when economic conditions and local
choices revealed inadequacies in transportation system
and housing densities. They learned that the residents
provided the best source of information about necessary
improvements in the quality of existing village centers
and local service needs. However, in Milton Keynes there
were no problems with squatters immigrating to the
project (as there were in Ciudad Guayana), and the local
government was well organized and institutionally mature.
In summary, the first two cases illustrate that ac-
tivities at the project site and interactions with the
local settlers can slow, halt, or alter strategic deci-
sions. Like Milton Keynes, the Hong Kong government
chose to locate the Sha Tin development office at the
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project site; however, the professionals viewed the local
people paternalistically as the Ciudad Guayana
professionals did. Class distinctions in Sha Tin are
similar to the Venezuelan operation -- the local people
are lower class and are so treated by the professionals.
In Sha Tin the local people are poorly informed un-
like the citizens in Milton Keynes. At times violent
confrontations have erupted between the development
authorities and villagers. The situation is similar to
Ciudad Guayana where the local settlers do not understand
the planning or development effort.
As in Milton Keynes there is a tradition bound
population living in the Sha Tin villages. The villagers
have historic land rights and, like Ciudad Guayana, these
villagers have been joined by an influx of squatters into
the region. However, unlike squatters in Venezuela, Hong
Kong squatters have no legal occupancy rights.
In all three new town projects the local people in-
fluenced development decisions. Sha Tin is more like
Ciudad Guayana where the influence was ad hoc and
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confrontational. Interactions with local people were
designed into the Milton Keynes development process. The
Venezuelan government ultimately responded to the local
pressure by opening an on-site office and being more at-
tentive to local problems.
To avoid the pitfalls of Ciudad Guayana and to build
on the Milton Keynes experience, local consultation
should become a part of the Sha Tin development process.
A process of consulting with the local citizens as sug-
gested in Chapter 6 can foster a greater sense of com-
munity on the part of the residents and should result in
environments more suitable to local needs. It is in the
interest of the professionals to take advantage of the
residents' ability to pinpoint problems before they be-
come insurmountable.
Consultation and local participation can be used as a
way to educate, inform, gather information or convince
people of the wisdom of pursuing a certain objective.
Local project reviews, as in Milton Keynes, can also be
used as a way to make local people more aware of changes
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occurring around them. However, the basic objective is
to enhance decision making through responsible local
control. Once the local residents demonstrate that they
have the capacity to provide relevant information and are
informed about their future, local problems in Sha Tin
should be easier to coordinate and resolve.
In the best of all possible worlds a development
process should include both central and decentral ways of
consulting local people and making decisions. As in
Milton Keynes, the local residents played a major role in
ensuring that their environments were appropriate to the
intended development. However, the process of consulting
with the residents was central to and coordinated by the
development office.
The chapter on three Sha Tin villages outlines steps
that should be taken when preserving, relocating or
redeveloping a village. The chapter keys on structuring
positive relationships between the professionals and the
local people and suggests ways to accommodate
complexities with the local people and the land. By
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building local institutions and networks to solve
problems the chapter suggests that decision making and
participation should be decentral at the village level.
In Sha Tin there should also be a centrally coor-
dinated process of consulting with the new town residents
similar to Milton Keynes. The process should be coor-
dinated by the development office so that decisions made
at the village level do not adversely affect other
aspects of the new town development.
Techniques similar to those used to consult with lo-
cal residents in Milton Keynes can also be used in Sha
Tin. Door to door surveys reveal not only attitudes (or
misconceptions) that residents have toward the project,
but can also be a means toward assessing the environmen-
tal quality of villages that may be preserved. Public
meetings in Milton Keynes organized to review development
proposals aided communication about the new community's
ultimate form and implementation strategy. The dialogue
generated at such meetings can be instrumental in
alerting the development office to potential service
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delivery problems or land use conflicts before a crisis
takes place.
To strengthen local government institutions, the
Heung Yee Kuk, the rural committees and the urban coun-
cils should become part of the government's planning and
design review process. These groups should begin review-
ing development proposals and decisions at strategic
points. The groups should become part of the development
office's regular design review process and their comments
can be coordinated with the other government agencies
that review planning proposals.
Instituting these forms of interaction with Sha Tin
villagers and new town residents will work in the long
term interest of the Hong Kong government. The overall
result of these measures should be heightened community
spirit, more informed planning decisions and more posi-
tive relations with the development office.
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